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Preface 
This thesis is the result of three years of research, both at the Mathematics 
institute of the University of Warwick and at the department of economics 
at New York University. I started this research project in December 2001. 
I was interested in the role of expectations in economic models. Given the 
mathematical difficulties that the topic presented, I decided to broaden my 
knowledge of applied dynamical systems and I joined the Interdisciplinary 
Program at the Mathematics institute. During my first year I attended 
lectures on dynamical systems and real analysis and in the second year I 
started working on my own project. 
I started analyzing macroeconomic models where aggregate expectations 
had a major role to determine production and consumption decisions. I 
was interested in modelling the learning behavior of economic agents and 
its effects on expectations. I then further specialized in economic models 
of monetary policy and how learning behavior of market participants and 
central banks would affect monetary policy design. 
In particular I studied non-linear two-dimensional dynamical systems, 
and showed how the non-linearities complicate the problem of monetary 
policy design, by introducing multiple equilibria in the model. I also focused 
on stochastic models of learning, using results from stochastic approximation 
theory to describe the dynamics of the agents' learning process. 
I think that with the papers of my thesis I have fulfilled my main goals. 
Nevertheless, this work has been made possible by the joint efforts of many 
colleagues and professors. I would like to thank my three advisors (formal 
and not! ) that taught me almost everything I know about mathematical 
economics: Jess Benhabib, Jim Bullard and Sebastian Van Strien. Sebastian 
Van Strien introduced me with infinite patience to the world of dynamical 
systems. The little understanding that I have of this complex field is because 
of him. I also thank him for having been supporting me from the start. 
I also thank Jess Benhabib for making it possible to visit the Economics 
department at NYU and especially for his constant advice on economics 
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and nonlinear dynamics. Jim Bullard has also helped rpe enormously with 
my dissertation. I began my collaboration with him as I joined the graduate 
internship program at the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. During my 
visit there I learnt a lot about how to write a potentially successful paper 
and how to develop successfully original ideas and suggestions. 
I also thank Marc Giannoni, Petra Geraats, Mark Gertler, Bruce Preston 
and Tom Sargent for very useful discussions that improved significantly the 
quality of my work. Any remaining errors in the thesis are mine. 
Declaration 
Chapter 1 is largely expository, with the exception of the simultaneous equa- 
tion model presented in the first section. Otherwise I declare that to the 
best of my knowledge the material in this thesis is the original work of the 
author except where stated explicitely in the text. 
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PREFACE 
Introduction 
In most economic models used for theoretical exploration or policy analysis, 
there is a crucial role for agents' expectations about future outcomes. Gen- 
erally, it is assumed that economic agents take their decisions according to 
rationality principles and that they have a fairly accurate knowledge about 
the economic environment. In other words, they are assumed to know the 
model of the economy (Rational Expectations Hypothesis). 
The latter assumption is somewhat extreme, given the evident lack of 
agreement, even among professionals, about the correct model of the econ- 
omy. In this thesis I maintain the hypothesis that agents take their decisions 
rationally, i. e. in order to maximize their utilities given their budget con- 
straints, but I assume that each agent has to learn about the economic 
environment. 
More specifically, I consider economic models for monetary policy analy- 
sis. The goal is to study how the introduction of learning in these models can 
affect the design of monetary policy. Policy recommendations that might be 
sound under Rational Expectations, might lead to disastrous results under 
learning. I also use learning as a selection device. Some economic models 
fail to predict a unique Rational Expectations Equilibrium. Nevertheless, a 
REE is a sensible prediction of the model only if it can be shown that it is 
the result of some learning process of the economic agents. REE that are 
unstable under learning are not plausible equilibria. 
The thesis is composed of two main essays. The first essay consider a 
simple class of non-linear monetary models that appear to have multiple 
REE. The goal of the essay is to compare the performance of two different 
policy rules. One policy rule states that the central bank has to set the 
nominal interest rate by responding to its forecast of future inflation. The 
other rule states that the central bank should set the interest rate according 
to current and past values of inflation. Higher inflation or expected inflation 
would trigger an increase in the nominal interest rate, consistently with the 
goal of the central bank to stabilize inflation around some target value. 
xi 
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The analysis shows that under the forecast-based policy rule there exist 
many REE equilibria that are stable under learning. Moreover, the market 
participants' learning process can generate learning equilibria, which would 
not exist under the assumption of rational expectations. The existence of 
different equilibria that can be reached depending on the initial conditions of 
the economic system is clearly destabilizing, given that only one equilibrium 
is generally consistent with the central bank's objectives. In the second part 
of the essay I show that adopting a policy rule that responds to current 
and past inflation leaves only one equilibrium that is stable under learning, 
and this equilibrium is the inflation target that the bank actually wants to 
achieve. I therefore conclude that policy rules that react to current and past 
inflation should be preferred. 
The second essay considers a class of linear monetary models. The goal 
of the paper is to show under what conditions central banks' transparency 
can enhance economic stability. central bank's transparency is related to 
the amount of information about policy decisions that the bank is willing to 
share with the public. In the essay I show that under plausible assumptions 
about the model of the economy, lack of knowledge about the policy rule and 
its effects on the economy can generate instability, even in the case where, 
under rational expectations, there is a unique and stable equilibrium. I show 
that improved transparency can shrink the set of policy rules that lead to 
instability. Nevertheless, if agents are uncertain about the true model of 
the economy, even in the case of perfect transparency of the central bank, 
some policy rules that perform well under RE, generate instability. The 
conclusion is that on one hand transparency helps stabilizing expectations 
but on the other hand many rules generate instability independently on how 
transparent is the central bank implementing the policy. 
Chapter 1 
Stochastic Approximation and Learning 
Dynamics: an Introduction 
In order to study the learning behavior of the economic agents, I make 
use of well known results from stochastic approximation theory, discussed in 
the book "Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics" by George Evans 
and Seppo Honkapohja (EH in the sequel). The material in these section 
is meant to illustrate the mathematical results used in the thesis and it is 
almost entirely taken from that book and complementary articles therein 
quoted. This section shows the main results. These results refer to linear 
or locally linearized models and have only local validity, as explained below. 
Some results in the first essay make use of extensions, whose references are 
mentioned in the text. 
The economic models considered can be written in compact notation as 
AoYt = Al + A2EtYt+1 + A3Xt (1.1) 
where Yt E ]R is a vector of endogenous variables (i. e. output, inflation and 
the interest rate), Fn denotes the average expectation operator, that includes 
information up to time t. The matrices Al, A2 are the time independent 
coefficients of the model, and Xt E R" represents a vector of exogenous 
variables. I assume that Xt represents stochastic shocks following an AR(1) 
process. Therefore 
Xt = HXt-i + Ct 
CHAPTER 1. 
where H is the matrix of autocorrelation coefficients and Ct E R° is an i. i. d. 
random vector of shocks, with zero mean. Economic agents ignore the true 
model of the economy and are endowed with a model (or Perceived Law of 
Motion, PLM), that they use for prediction. The model can be expressed as 
cloy = cii + Sl2Xt + t7i. (1.2) 
This is a parametric model with constant coefficients f2 = [cio, cli, 112], 
'lt E 1R' is a perceived i. i. d. shock, with zero mean. The parameters are 
re-estimated every period, as new information arrives. The estimated model 
is 
no, t-iY = Oi, t-1 + St2, t-1Xt (1.3) 
where the coefficients Ot_l = [Oo, t-i, 
Ol, 
t-1 712, t-i] are re-estimated every 
period. Itt_l denotes the t-1 estimate of the coefficients. In order to 
estimate the coefficients, the agents use standard econometric techniques. 
Notice that this is a system of simultaneous equations. In order to estimate a 
model like (1.3), the agents need to impose restrictions on the matrices in f2. 
These restrictions consist of requiring that some coefficient in the matrices 
is zero. More discussion about estimation and identification of simultaneous 
equations can be found in Ch. 3 where I consider an application to a specific 
model. In the second essay I somewhat extend the standard framework used 
in the economic literature, by allowing the agents to use not only the well 
known Recursive Least Squares estimator, that would lead to inconsistent 
estimates of (1.3), but also a Recursive Instrumental Variables estimators, 
depending on the existence of simultaneity in the equations of their model. 
According to this more general class of estimators, the coefficients' estimates 
are updated according to the following algorithm 
Ct = Ct-i + Jd 
11Qt (Ye - (ßä_1U ))' (1.4) 
Rt = Rt-i + 5t (QtUU - 74-1) 
where ýt is the (n + 1) x1 real valued vector of the estimated coefficients in 
SZt that have not been restricted to zero. Consider the following real valued 
matrices: Rt of dimension (n + 1)2 x (n + 1)2, Qt of dimension (n + 1)2 x 
(n + 1) and Ut. of dimension (n + 1) x 1. The first matrix is 
Rt = 
(In ® Rth) 
where Rth is the nxn precision matrix associated to each single equation h 
(where h=1,... n). The precision matrix is an estimate of Et.,,. QtUt. Also 
Qt =(In0Vt) 
is a matrix containing the instruments V (which includes a constant), while 
Ut is the matrix or regressors that might contain current endogenous vari- 
ables. Finally, öt is a nonincreasing sequence of real valued gains, whose 
properties are defined below. In the case of recursive least squares, we sim- 
ply set Ut =V= (1, Xt) and Rth = Rt. Given their estimate in (1.3), the 
agents' expectation for the next period value of Y becomes 
EtYt+i = O, t_11i, t-i + SZo, t-i1l2, t-iHXt (1.5) 
where I assume that the t-information set includes current observations of 
Xt. Notice that the agents use t-1 estimates of the coefficients to form 
expectations at time t: this is an assumption that simplifies the analysis of 
convergence. Substituting the expectation (1.5) in (3.8) I obtain the Actual 
Law of Motion (ALM) for the variables 
Yt = AO-1A, 
(S2o, t-1S1, t-1 +Slat-1O2, t-1HXt) +Aý'A2Xt (1.6) 
= A0-'A1O t-1O1, t-i + Aý 1 
(AiSlo, t-iO2, t-iH + A2) Xt 
= r(G-i) (1, X0, 
where the function T (. ) denotes the mapping between the PLM and the 
Actual Law of Motion (ALM) of the economic system. The value of C 
such that ALM = PLM, i. e. T (C*) = C`, is the Rational Expectations 
Equilibrium. Stability under learning means that the sequence of estimates 
Ct converges to C`. Substituting (1.6) in (3.17) we get : 
(1.7) ct = et-i +bt74 1Qt (r (Ct-i) V- (et-1Üt) +et)' 
Rt = Rt-i + St (QtUU - Rt_l) 
where e' denotes a vector of i. i. d. normally distributed observational shocks 
with zero mean and standard deviation ae that make the learning process 
non-trivial. Observation shocks capture the fact that the agents might have 
observations on Yt that contain errors. Notice again that I assume that 
in taking expectations at time t the agents observe the current values of 
the variables but use time t-1 parameters' estimates. This assumption is 
common in the literature and it is made to simplify the analysis. 
4 
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In order to study the convergence properties of (3.20), we need to use results 
from stochastic approximation theory. Let Ot E Rd (where in the case of the 
example above d= 2n + n4). Also, let Zt E Rk (in our case k= 4n) be the 
vector of observable variables. 
Let us rewrite the system as: 
Bt = Bt-i + öt4l (Bt-i, Zt) X1.8) 
where 
Bt vec(Rt)) . 
Here (. ) : Rd xRk -º Rd is a function describing how the vector Ot is 
updated. The vector of state variables Zt evolves according to 
Zt =B (Bt-1) Zt_1 + CWt (1.9) 
where the coefficient matrix B (Bt-1) is real time varying and dependent 
on Ot and the matrix C is real and time invariant. Also, Wt is a random 
disturbance term. Further properties of (1.9) are discussed below. 
Considering the example of the previous section, we can define 
Zt = [1, Yt, Xt, et] 
Wt = [1, Ct, et] 
()nxn Onxn ()nxn 
B (B) - 
0nXl Onxn V (Z) Onxn 
Onxl Onxn H ()nxn 
Onxl Onxn °nxn OnXn 
1 Olxn Olxn 
C= 
Onxl 0 Onxn 
Onx1 Inxn Onxn 
Onxl 0 Inxn 
Let us consider the point B* where the economy is at the REE, i. e. B* _ 
(ý*, R*) such that T (C*) = C* and R* = Fi-ooQtUt (ý*). Assume for the 
moment that B* is an equilibrium point for the system (1.8): that is, assume 
that Ot -º B* as t -+ oo. Let DC Rd be an open set around B*. Then 
consider the following set of assumptions: 
1.1. CONVERGENCE 5 
A. 1.1 bt is a positive, nonstochastic, decreasing sequence satisfying 
00 00 
E at=oo, d Eöi <oo 
t=i t=i 
A. 1.2 lirntýý sup [1/öt - 11bt_11 < oo 
A. 2. For any compact QCD, there exist C and q such that for 
every 0EQ, 
Iý5(e, Z)Isc(l+1x14) 
A. 3.1 For any compact QCD, the function (0, Z) is continuously 
differentiable with bounded partial derivatives in every Q. 
A. 3.2 For any compact QCD and for every 0,0' EQ and z1, z2 E Rk 
the function 4> (0, Z) satisfies 
(i) IaD (e, zi) /Oz - aP (B, x2) lazl < L, Izi - z2I (I1 + IziIPI + Iz2Ip' I), for some pl and some constant Ll. 
(ii) Iah (0, z) /az - a-D (0', z) /az1 < L2 10 - 0'l (1 + IzI ), for 
some p2 and some constant L2. 
B. 1. Wt is i. i. d with I Wt I<C. 
B. 2 For any compact QCD 
sup IB(e)1: pQ <1 
OEQ 
for some matrix norm 11, and B (B) satisfies Lipschitz conditions on Q. 
Given the assumptions above, the local properties of the system (1.8), 
(1.9) can be studied by checking the stability conditions of an ordinary 
differential equation. This can be obtained from the asymptotic expected 
value of the function C Let 0EQ, define 
Zt (B) =B (B) 2t_1 + CWi 
and consider the behavior of the mean of (0, Zt (B)) 
h(9) =slim E4P (0,2 (0)). (1.10) 
The associated ODE is then defined as 
9= h(9) 
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As shown below, it is possible to study the local behavior of (1.9) by focusing 
on the local stability of (1.10). The following two Lemmas describe the 
existence and the properties of (1.10). 
Lemma 1 Assume B. 2 and let 0EQ. Then Z= (0) tends in the limit to an 
Lp-integrable random variable Z. (0). 
Proof. see EH, Lemma 6.1, pag. 129.   
Lemma 2 Assume A. 2. Then h(0) exists. -Assume A. 3. Then h(0) is 
locally Lipschitz 
Ih(B) - h(B') 1< 10 - O', 
for every 0, Of E Q. 
Proof. see EH, Lemma 6.2, p. 129.   
I briefly introduce the main steps to 'connect' the ODE with the original 
system. The algorithm (1.8) can be written in the following form: 
Bn+l = 6n + bn+lh(O) + fn (1.11) 
where fn is the approximation error between the algorithm and the associ- 
ated differential equation. Here I change notation from t to n, given that 
(1.11) denotes a standard discretization of the differential equation (1.10). 
The next step is to develop bounds on the expression E fn. We can rewrite 
(1.11) as 
fn = an+l [4) (Bn, Zn+1) - h(On)J 
More specifically, as it becomes clear below, we need bounds on sums of 
expressions of the form 
fn(q5) = c(en+l) - g5(en) - ari+1q5'(O)h(O) (1.12 
where 0: Rd -º R is twice continuously differentiable with bounded second 
derivatives. Let Q be defined as above and let 
T (Q) = inf (n: 9n 0 Q) 
denote the first time rr that O, i leaves Q 
(if On EQ for every n then T= oo). 
The following Lemma provides bounds for the sum of the approximation 
error, provided On E Q. 
1.1. CONVERGENCE 7. 
Lemma 3 For all initial values zE Rk and aE Rk there exist constants 
B1 and s such that 
In-1 11 2 00 00 
2 21 E,,, SUP I(n<r(Q)) ý fk(O) :5 Bl(l + IzIs) 1(' +E lsk bk n ký k=n+1 k=n+1 
where E.,,. denotes the expectation over the joint distribution of (Zn, 9 )nil and 
I denotes the indicator function. Moreover, if r (Q) = oo then E fn (0) con- 
verges almost surely. 
Proof. see Evans and Honkapohja (1998), pp. 80-83. The proof considers a 
more general case where Zt follows a Markov Process dependent on 0t_1. The 
main theorems needed for the proof are Doob's inequality and the Martingale 
Convergence Theorem.   
The above result puts a bound on the sum of the approximation errors, 
provided 0. stays in Q. 
After the above preliminary results, we proceed to analyze the asymp- 
totic behavior' of the algorithm (1.8). The goal is to show that if 6* is 
locally stable in the ODE, then the algorithm (1.8) converges to B* with 
some positive probability. 
Let B* a locally asymptotically stable point of the ODE. Then it can 
be shown that on the domain of attraction D of B* there exists a twice 
continuously differentiable Lyapunov function U (O) : Rd -º R with the 
following propertiesl 
(i) U(0*)=0, U(0)>Oforall 0ED, 0rh 0*; 
(ii) U' (0) h(0) <0 for all 0ED, 0# 0*; 
(iii) U (0) - oo if 0- öD or 101 -+ oo. 
where OD is the boundary of D. 
Let K(c) = {O : U(B) < c}, c>0, the compact set defined by the C 
contour of U and r(c) = inf(n : B V K(c)). Let 0< cl < c2 and K(c2) CD 
and choose 0 such that 
a) 0 coincides with U(. ) on K(c2); 
b) info.. OK(c2) 0(e) _ C2" 
'See Proposition 5.9, EH(2001). 
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If T(c2) < oo, from (1.12) we get 
7'(c2)-1 7*(c2)-1 
(BT(c))- 
q5 (00)= E Jk+11/(Ok)h(Ok) +> fk(c)" 
k=O k-0 
When Oo =aEK (cl), we have that c2 - cl = infe,. ¢K(c) 0(0) - Cl S 
c (BT(U)) -¢ (Bo). On the other hand, since 4'(0) = U'(8) on K(c2) we have 
4'(0k)h(Ok) < 0. Thus 
T(om)-1 .. -i 
(C2-C1)I(T(c2)<oo) <I(r(«)<c) fk(0) SSUPIn<r(c2) 7Efk(0) 
O" k=o 
which, after squaring both sides and taking the expected value, gives 
(c2 - cl)2 EE SnpIn<r(ý) 
n-1 
Efk(0) 
Z 
k=O 
which implies 
P[I(r(c2)<oo)] : (c2-cl)-2E sup In<-r(c2) 
n-1 1: fk(O) 
'i k=O 
11 
Since, the conditional distribution of (Zn+k, On+k) given Z,, = z, On =a is 
equal to the conditional distribution of (Zn, On) given Zo = z, 00 =a and 
with ryn replaced with 7n+k, the result holds also for any n>0. Hence, 
using Lemma (3) 
In-1 2 00 00 
Ez,, SUP In<r(c2) 
E fk(O) < B1 (1 + tzI') 1 ak ak 
n k=0 
11 K 
k=n+1 I k=n+1 
for some Bl and s. Hence 
00 oc 
P [I(T(c2)<ý)] :5B, (1 + 1zß') 
[(1 
+E bk ak 
k=n+1 k=n+1 
for some Bl and s. Finally, let P, L, z,,, denote the probability distribution 
of (Zk, Ok)k>n, with Z, a =z and B, a = a. The results above lead to the 
following Theorem (see Evans and Honkapohja, 1998) 
1.1. CONVERGENCE 
Theorem 4 Let 9* be an asymptotically stable equilibrium point of the ODE 
(1.10). Suppose Assumptions A 1.1., A 2., A 3. and B are satisfied and 
D= int(K(c)) for some c>0. Suppose that for some 0< cl < c2, we have 
K(c2) C D. 
(i) Then there exist Bl and s such that for all aE K(cl), n>0, z 
P,,,.,,, (et leaves K(c2) in finite time) < Bl(1+lz13) 
K1+ 
6k 2) 21 t ck 
k=n+1 k=n+1 
(ii) Suppose that 0< Cl < ca, we have K(c2) C D. Then for all aE 
K(ci), n>0, z 
Pn, z, 0 (Bt leaves K(c2) in finite time or Bt --º 9*) =1 
(iii) for any compact QCD, there exist constants B2 and s such that 
for all aE K(cl), n>0, z 
0 
62 P,,,.,,. ( Ot -+ 0*) =1 -B2(1 + 
lzl") 
Ki 
+E j2 E 
o) 
k=n+1 k=n+1 
Proof. see EH (1998). (ii) Let v(c) = inf (n, 0, E K(c)). Pick 0< cl < c2. 
From the properties of the U function we have that on D there exists a>0 
such that -0' (0) h (9) >_ a for all 0 such that cl < 0(0) < c2. Assume for 
a contradiction that v(cl) = oo, so that 9, does not reach K(cl) in finite 
time. It then follows from (1.12) that on the set {v(cl) =T (c2) = oo} we 
have, for all m>n 
mm 
> fk 
(O) = 
(q5 (Om) 
-O 
(en))- > ^ik+10' (Ok) h (Ok) 1.13) 
k=n k=n 
>- (c2 - Cl) +c 
k=sa 
ý'Yk+l 
but since F-k 'yk+l -º 00 as m -+ oo, (1.13) implies that >k n 
fk (0) -º 
oo. This contradicts the above result that Em n 
fk (0) converges almost 
surely on IT (c2) = oo}. Hence v(cl) < o0 on {T (c2) = oo}. This means 
that On enters K(cl) in finite time. It remains to show that On -º 0'. 
We need to show that lim sup 0 (0, a) <ca. s. on 
IT (c2) = oo}, for every 
0<c< c2, z and aE K(c). Again we proceed by contradiction. Fix 
10 CHAPTER 1. 
0< cl <c< c2. By the previous result, whenever 0, a leaves K(c) it 
returns in finite time to K(cl) a. s. on {T (c2) = oo}. Consider the set 
{T (c2) = oo, llm sup 0 (0, i) > c} and let v1 = v(cl), Tl = id>v1 (Bn V K(c)) 
vk ='k>rk-1 (en E K(cl)), Tk = mmfk>vk (9 V K(c)). All these are finite 
by assumption and vk > k. From (1.12) and using 0'(0,, ) h' (0,, ) < 0, we 
have that for all k 
Tn-1 
o< (c - ci) <0 (Gm) -0 (evn) <E ft (0) " k=ön 
But then >k"_ý' fk (0) cannot be a Cauchy sequence, contradicting the re- 
sult that it converges as. on {r (c2) = oo}. We have come to a contradiction. 
This implies that for every c lim sup 0 (0n) <c and thus limt, 0 (0,, ) = 0. 
Hence, from the properties of 0 on D, B,, -º 0* as. on {r (c2) = oo}. 
(iii) follows from (i) and (ii).   
The Theorem states that if On E K(cl) at any time n than the probability 
that Bt leaves K(c2) at time t>n is bounded by an expression that goes 
to zero as t -+ oo. Nevertheless, the result shows that at any point in time 
n there is the possibility that a large shock drives Bt>n outside the basin of 
attraction K (c2) cQ so that the algorithm does not converge to 0*. 
In order to guarantee convergence we modify the algorithm (1.8) to 
include a so called projection facility. The projection facility eliminates 
the possibility that large shocks send Ot outside the basin of attraction 
K (c2) C Q. It simply states that if OE int(K (c2)) the algorithm is fol- 
lowed. Otherwise Bt is projected to some point in K(cl). In other words, 
the algorithm dictates: 
_ 
Bt-i + Stlb (et-i, Zt) if [Bt-i + ötý (et-1, Zt)] E int(K (c2)) Bt 9EK (cl) if [9t-1 + 8t4i (Bt-i, Zt)) V int(K (c2)) 
(1.14) 
That captures the idea that the agents have a shared prior about the interval 
of the possible values for 9*, i, e. they are 'confident' that 0* EK (cl). If 
the recursive estimator gives them a value that is implausible (i. e. too far 
from the confidence interval) on the basis of their prior information, they 
discard it and use instead a value that lie in the interval. Corollary 6.8 in 
EH (2001) proves that modifying the algorithm with such projection facility 
guarantees convergence with probability 1. 
Of course imposing a projection facility has been subjected by much 
criticism. The most compelling one is that under the assumption of decen- 
tralized market is somewhat implausible that the economic agents would 
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coordinate on a shared prior about the true parameter value 0*. Neverthe- 
less, this assumption is less restrictive than rational expectations. Also, in 
the simulations that I show in Ch. 3, I do not employ a projection facility. 
The next step is to show that (i) the algorithm cannot converge to a 
point that is not an equilibrium point of the ODE, i. e. the REE, and (ii) 
the algorithm will not converge to an unstable equilibrium point of the ODE. 
The following theorem summarizes the result 
Theorem 5 Consider the algorithm with assumptions A and B. Suppose a 
some point 0* E D, we also have the validity of the conditions (i) (D (o*, Zt (9*)) 
has a covariance matrix that is bounded below by a positive definite matrix, 
and (ii) E4D (9`, Zt (0')) is continuously differentiable in 0, in a neighbor- 
hood of 9* and the derivatives converge uniformly in this neighborhood as 
t -º oo. Then (a) if h(9*) #0 or (b) if äh(0*)/ö0 has an eigenvalue with a 
positive real part, then 
P(Ot--+0*)=0 
Proof. see Ljung (1977).   
The intuition for the result is that as long as there is randomness in the 
system, i. e. assumption (i), Bt will leave any unstable point of the ODE. 
The results above allow us to study the local stability under learning of a 
REE by checking only the local stability of the associated ODE. The results 
have been extended for a special class of nonlinear models. The following 
section briefly sums up the results, to be found in EH(2001), EH(1995). 
These results are used in Ch. 2. 
1.2 Learning and Stability of Nonlinear Models 
In Ch. 2I study the dynamics of an univariate nonlinear model that can be 
described as 
1/t =H (EtG (yt+i, et+i) , et) 
(1.15) 
where lit E R, et denotes a one dimensional random shock i. i. d. distributed, 
with mean zero and bounded support. Also H: 1R2 -º R, G: R2 -+ II8 are 
assumed to be twice continuously differentiable on some open rectangle. As 
above Et is the expectation operator, with respect to time t information. 
Finally, it is assumed that G is observable to the agents. In the chapter 
I mainly consider the deterministic case where et =0 for every t. In the 
nonstochastic case (1.15) becomes a one dimensional dynamical system. I 
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study the possible fixed points of the system and I investigate the existence 
of cycles of second order. In terms of the economic model, fixed points and 
cycles are defined perfect foresight equilibria. That means that the agents 
are assumed to know with certainty the future evolution of the variable yt, 
i. e. EtG (yt+i, 0) =G (yt+l, 0) . 
This is a stronger assumption than ratio- 
nal expectations, but is commonly used when analyzing nonlinear economic 
models. Some results in Ch. 2 concern the stability under learning of these 
equilibria. 
This section focuses on the case where et is not zero, even if with a small 
support. In this case, the theorems described above can be used to study 
the local stability under learning of the stochastic REE of (1.15). Let us 
define first a rational noisy 2-cycle as a stochastic process of the form 
yt = yl (et) fort mod 2=1 
yt = y2 (et) for t mod 2=0 
where the two functions y satisfy 
yl (et) =H (EtG (y2 (et+l) , et+l) , et) for t mod 2=1 
y2 (et) =H (EtG (yi (et+l) , et+i) , et) for t mod 2=0. 
Notice that this includes a steady state where yl (et) = V2 (et). Also, notice 
that while yt is a stochastic process, the expectations follow a deterministic 
cycle 
92 if t mod 2 =1 EiG (yt+i (et+i). et+i) _{ 91 if t mod 2=0 
where 
Bi = EtG (yi (et+1) ' et+l) 
I can re-express yl (et) =H (92i Si) and y2 (et) =H (91, et), so that the 
rational noisy cycle can be defined by (Bl, 02) such that 
91 = EG(H(02iet), et) 
62 = EG(H(9j, et), et) 
where E denotes the unconditional mean and we are using the fact that the 
shocks are i. i. d. Note that by setting the noise equal to zero we revert to 
the deterministic case. EH(1995) prove the existence of noisy cycles for the 
case where the support of the shock is `small'. I omit the details for brevity. 
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1.2.1 Recursive Learning and Convergence 
The main assumption is that the agents believe that the economy is in a 
noisy cycle and attempt to estimate the mean value of G(yt, et) at different 
points in the cycle. A natural estimator of (0k) 02) is given by separate 
sample means for each stage of the cycle (recall that G is assumed to be 
observable). Putting the estimator in recursive form we obtain 
( G(yi, 8, el,, ) - 01,8-i 
) 
(1.16) (0» 
1_r 01,8-1 1+ as 
) 
02,9 Jl) 02,8-i G(y2, a, e2,, ) - 82,, -1 
Bt,. = EG(y28+1, egg+; ) (1.17) 
where s is a positive number such that t= 2s + i, for i=1,2. Again detail 
for the derivation of (1.16) can be found in EH(2001). The system under 
learning dynamics is given by the equations (1.16), (1.17) and (1.15) and it 
defines a stochastic recursive algorithm. It can be re-expressed as 
Ba = B8-1 + b8 (M (Ba-1, ad, e, ) - 0. -1) (1.18) 
where B, = (81,,, 82,, ), e, = (el,,, e2,, ) and M [Ml, M2] 
Mi =G (H (82,8-i, ei,, ) , ei,, 
) 
M2 =G (H (61,, -1 + 
ö8 (G (H (92,8-i, ei,, ) , ei,, 
) - 9i,, -1) , e2,, 
) 
, e2,, 
) 
Having put the learning algorithm in the form (1.8), it is possible to study 
the convergence of B, by analyzing the associated differential equation. The 
equation is 
9= lim EM(B, 6,, e, )-8 8-'00 
Taking individual components in turn one obtains 
9=T(B)-B (1.19) 
where 
T (9) = (R (02), R (91)) and 
R(01) = E(G(H(Bc, et), et)) 
Using the above results from stochastic approximation theory it is possible 
to determine the behavior of the stochastic algorithm from the behavior of 
the associated ODE. Evaluating the stability of the ODE at the noisy REE, 
we obtain the following stability condition 
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Proposition 6 Consider an REE noisy cycle of oraler 2 of the model (1.15), 
with expectation parameters 6. Then the ODE (1.19) is stable if an only if 
S=xe(01)R'(02)<1. (1.20) 
Condition (1.20) is also referred to as E-Stability in the economic literature. 
The following proposition describes the convergence result for the stochastic 
algorithm 
Proposition 7 Consider an REE noisy 2-cycle of the model (1.15), and 
with expectation parameters 9. Suppose that 9 is a locally stable point of 
(1.19). Then B is locally stable under adaptive learning. If instead 9 is an 
unstable point of (1.19) then B, converges to 9 with probability zero. 
In this section I omit the proofs. The proof of the proposition can be 
found in EH (1995). As mentioned above, in Ch. 2 I consider the determin- 
istic case where et = 0. In that case the stability condition becomes 
6= F'(91)F'(92) <1 (1.21) 
whereF(y) =H (G (y, 0) , 0) 
and V1,: 92 denote the points on the cycle. By continuity, noisy cycles with 
sufficiently small noise are also stable, provided (1.21) holds. This is the 
result mostly used in Ch. 2. 
Another class of rational expectations equilibria that is studied in Ch. 2 is 
that of sunspot equilibria. The definition of sunspot equilibrium involves the 
basic idea that economic agents in the model condition their expectations on 
some (random) variable st which otherwise does not have any influence on 
the model economy. Let us assume that the extraneous random variable st 
is a two-state Markov chain with a constant transition matrix 11 = (7r, ) , 
0< -7r=j < 1, for i, j=1,2. Moreover, st =0 in state 1 and st =1 in state 
2. 
Definition 8A two-state stationary sunspot equilibrium (SSE) is a process 
yt = yi, if st =0 and it = y2 if st = 1, such that 
yi = iriiF(y)+(1-au)F(y2*) 
Y2* = (1 - 7r22) F 
(yi) + 7r22F (y2) 
where F (. ) is defined as in (1.21). 
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Under suitable regularity conditions the following two results hold 
1. Let pi, y2 denote the points on a two-period cycle, with yl # y2. Then 
there exist SSEs yl, y2 near yl, 92 with 711,1r22 close to zero. 
2. Let yl, y2 denote two distinct steady states, with yl # y2. Then there 
exist SSEs yi, y2 near yl, y2 with 7r1l, 1r22 close to one. 
3. Let y denote a steady state. Then there exist SSEs yl, y2 near 
provided F' (y) > 1. 
Such an SSE is also called an c- SSE, to denote that it lies in a neigh- 
borhood 0< e' < e, for some small e, of the deterministic equilibrium. The 
results are stated very informally. The interested reader should check EH 
(1994), EH (2001). Since the sunspot equilibria are close to the determin- 
istic equilibria, they can be showed to "inherit" their stability properties. 
Hence the sunspots are going to be stable provided (1.21) holds. 
More generally, a general condition for the existence of sunspots is the 
following. 
Proposition 9 For two points yl, y2, assume that F (yl) <F (y2). There 
exist 0< iri, 3 <1 such that yl, y2 is an SSE with transitional proba- 
bilities 7rjj if and only if the points yl, y2, both lie in the open interval 
(F (yi), F (yi))" 
An example is given in the Appendix of Ch. 2. 
Assume that the agents do not know the states yi, y2 and needs to learn 
about them. Assume, without loss of generality that the agents know the 
transition matrix of st. Concerning local stability under learning, we need 
to define a recursive algorithm. This is given by 
cbi, t = ol, t-1 + t-'; Gl, t-i qj; 
1 
i 
(yt-i - ol, t-i + Et-i) (1.22) 
qi, e = qz, t-i +t-1(b1, t-i - qi, t-i) 
which gives the following actual law of motion: 
yt = +/i1, t[iriiF 
(ci, 
t) + (1 - 7rii) F 
(02, 
t)] + (1.23) 
+'cb2, t{(1- 7r22)F 
(0i, 
t) + ir22F 
(c2, 
t)] 
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where g1, t denotes the estimate of the 1 state of the sunspot equilibrium value 
of yt. The algorithm works as follows. The agents observe a sunspot Markov 
process st. They are assumed to know the transition matrix. They update 
recursively each estimate of yl (for I=1,2) depending on the current state 
of the sunspot: the variable 01, t is equal to one if the sunspot process is in 
state I and zero otherwise. Also, ql, t represents the fraction of observations 
in state 1 over the whole sample up to time t-1. Finally 01, t represents the 
estimates of yj in the two states of the sunspots and et is a measurement error 
i. i. d, with bounded support. In order to study the stability properties of the 
algorithm let us define Oft = (¢1. t+ c52, tj qi, t, q2, t) and Zt' _ 
(101, 
ti 102, t) 'Et) and 
the functions 
Ht (et-1 Ze) = t, t-i91, t1 1(yt-i - ýt. t-i +Et-1) fort = 1,2 
H3 (Bt-i, Zt) = 01, t-i - 4t, t-i for j=1,2. 
This allows us to put the system in the standard form (1.19). The associated 
ODE becomes 
h1 (e) = ir141 
1(ir11F (01) + (1 - ir11) F (O2) - c1) 
(1.24) 
h2 (B) 
_ e2911(7r22F 
(q1) + (1 - 7r22) F 
(O2) 
- 02) 
h3(9) = ir1 - 41 
h4(0) = es - qs 
where frl, fr2 is the limiting distribution of the states of the Markov chain. 
Clearly at the equilibrium point irl = qj, fr2 = q2. Also, in the ODE the last 
two equations always converge, independently of ¢, i. e. fr'1 -º ql, fr2 q2. 
Therefore the ODE is stable provided 
d(01,02)1 
dr = 
T(01902) - 
(01+02)' 
is stable at the point ¢1 = yl, 02 = y2, where T is given by the right hand 
side of the first two equation of the associated ODE (1.24). The following 
propositions follow from the above result and are used in Ch. 2. 
Proposition 10 (i) The learning rule (2.13) converges locally to an SSE 
yl, y2 provided the eigenvalues of DT (yl, y2) have real parts less than one. 
(ii) Suppose that DT (yl, y2) has one eigenvalue with real part greater 
than one. The learning dynamics converges to the SSE with probability zero. 
1.3. SOME KEY DEFINITIONS 17 
Proposition 11 (i) let yl, y2 denote the points on a two-period cycle with 
F' (yl) F' (y2) # 0. Then all e' - SSE relative to yl, yZ are locally stable 
under learning if and only if (1.21) holds. 
(ii) Given two distinct steady states : V1, y2. Then all c- SSE relative to 
yl, y2 are locally stable under learning if and only if F' (yl) < 1, F' (y2) <1 
hold. 
(iii) Let :V be a steady state that is not stable under learning, i. e. F (g) > 
1. Then all e' - SSE relative tog are locally unstable under learning. Let 
F (y) < -1, then there exist e' - SSE relative toy that are locally stable 
under learning. 
Proof. The result follow from the definition of the T map and from the 
continuity of eigenvalues of DT. See EH (2001), Proposition 12.9,12.10, 
EH (2001a).   
1.3 Some Key Definitions 
This section defines some concepts that are commonly used in economics 
and that might be unfamiliar to the reader with a more mathematical back- 
ground. 
Taylor Rule. A Taylor rule is an approximation to actual monetary 
policy decisions taken by the Federal Reserve. Originally proposed by John 
Taylor, it states that the central bank decides the short term nominal in- 
terest rate according to a time invariant rule. The rule dictates that if the 
inflation rate is higher than a certain value decided by the central bank, 
called the inflation target, then the interest rate should be raised. The op- 
posite happens if inflation is lower than target. Moreover, the rule states 
that if output is higher than its long term trend, then the interest rate should 
be raised. 
An active Taylor rule is a Taylor rule that states that the interest rate 
should be changed more than proportionally, than the change in the inflation 
rate from target (i. e. it states that the central bank should increase the real 
interest rate). 
The Taylor Principle states that if a policy rule is active, then the econ- 
omy is stable. What does `stable' mean in the class of models considered in 
the Thesis? I need to define two more concepts. 
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Determinate REE. A rational expectations equilibrium is said to be 
determinate if it is unique. We say that the equilibrium is locally determi- 
nate if there do not exist other equilibria in a small neighborhood of it. An 
economic model, as the ones included in the thesis, can be expressed as a 
one dimensional difference equation in the economic variable y, i. e. 
Ut+i =F (Ut) 
where a REE is a real valued sequence (yo, ... y) 
for n=0... oo , such that, 
given (yo,... yn); a) economic agents optimize their utility, b) their resource 
constraint is satisfied. Condition for local uniqueness of the equilibrium is 
that F' (y*) > 1, where y* =F (y*). That means that the only equilibrium 
is (y*, 
... y*) ,a constant value 
for the economic variable y. Why? Suppose 
we pick yo # y*, then the yt will diverge from y'. Such (locally) explosive 
behavior of increasing or decreasing yt cannot be considered an equilibrium, 
since we do not observe such a behavior in economic variables. Take con- 
sumption: if consumption is growing without bound, this is unlikely to be an 
equilibrium because soon the agents in the economy will not have resources 
to pay for it. Hence, this cannot be an equilibrium. Since the agents in the 
economy are assumed to have perfect foresight, they will not select such a 
path for consumption. Also, negative consumption could be ruled out with a 
similar argument (i. e. the agents wouldn't be maximizing their utility with 
such a low consumption! ). 
Naturally, the arguments used above make more sense if we could show 
that there does not exists any bounded trajectory for yt, other than con- 
stant y*. This amounts to showing global determinacy. If there exist other 
bounded trajectories for yt, then there might be other equilibria, provided a) 
and b) are not violated. If F' (y*) <1 there are infinite sequences satisfying 
a) and b) and converging to the steady state. Each of these sequences is an 
equilibrium. Under REE, a determinate steady state is a stable equilibrium 
because the economy stays forever at the steady state. In an indeterminate 
equilibrium we get instability, because arbitrary changes in expectations can 
give equilibria where y changes over time. For a more precise formulation 
of the above concepts, see Farmer (1999). 
Learnability. I use this term in the thesis, because it is commonly 
adopted by economists. It simply means that the algorithms described above 
converge to the REE. 
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Chapter 2 
Forecast-Based v. Backward-Looking 
Policy Rules: a "Global" Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
In the monetary policy literature forecast-based Taylor rules are widely used 
and recommended for policy analysisl. However, recent contributions have 
shown that forecast-based policy rules might have important drawbacks. 
First, they might lead to indeterminate equilibria, as shown by Woodford 
(2002) and Bullard and Mitra (2001). Second, Levin, Wieland and Willi ams 
(2001) show that their performance might not be robust to uncertainty about 
the model of the economy. Third, they are not consistent with a conventional 
intertemporal loss function, as proved by Svensson (2001). 
Moreover, Evans, Honkapohja and Marimon (2001), and Carlstrom and 
Fuest (2001a) show the existence of learnable sunspot equilibria if the infla- 
tion target equilibrium is indeterminate. 
In general, it is a well known result that adopting Taylor rules might 
generate instability in the economic system. On one side, a nonlinear Taylor 
rule (consistent with a zero bound on the interest rate) implies the existence 
of two steady states, see Benhabib et al. (2001a). One is the inflation target 
and the other is a low inflation/deflation equilibrium. On the other side, 
'See, among the others, Batini and Nelson (2001). 
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Benhabib et al. (2001b) show that in a simple model where money enters 
in the production function, linear and nonlinear Taylor rules might lead to 
cycles or even chaotic behavior. 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the performance of forecast- 
based and backward-looking Taylor rules in a class of simple monetary 
models. In the course of the paper I focus on those policy rules that satisfy 
the `Taylor Principle' and guarantee local determinacy of the inflation tar- 
get steady state. I therefore restrict the analysis to the best-case scenario 
where local indeterminacy does not appear. I then consider the possibility 
of learnable global equilibria and how the choice of the Taylor rule affects 
their existence or changes their stability. 
In particular, I study the existence of. a) learnable cycles and sunspots 
around the determinate inflation target equilibrium and, b) learnable lick 
uidity traps implied by the zero bound condition on the policy rule - and so 
far considered a mere theoretical curiosity, e. g. in McCallum (2001). 
I show that forecast-based Taylor rules have a destabilizing effect on the 
economy: they lead to learnable cycles and sunspots, even in the case where 
the inflation target equilibrium is locally unique and stable under learning. 
Moreover, the economy can converge to a liquidity trap that is stable under 
learning. In contrast, adopting a backward-looking Taylor rule stabilizes 
the economy. In fact, equilibrium cycles disappear, while sunspot equilibria 
and the liquidity trap become unstable under learning (i. e. not robust to 
expectational mistakes). 
I do not analyze the welfare properties of the equilibria. The analysis 
is conducted from the point of view of the central banker. any equilibrium 
other than the inflation target is considered a `bad' equilibrium, in the sense 
that the policy goal is systematically missed. As it is common in this class 
of models, the inflation target equilibrium does not necessarily Pareto dom- 
inate the other equilibria, if the welfare criterion is based on the agent's 
intertemporal utility function. 
The paper is structured as follows. The second section quickly reviews 
the model and introduces the learning algorithm. The third section ana- 
lyzes stability under learning of steady states, cycles and sunspots under 
a forecast-based Taylor rule and discusses the main results. The fourth 
section compares the performance of forecast-based and backward-looking 
Taylor rules. 
2.2. THE MODEL 
2.2 The Model 
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I consider a simple model of the economy with flexible prices, a discrete time 
version of the model of Benhabib et al. (2001a). The model has three main 
components. 
The representative agent's problem. Agents take consumption, pro- 
duction and saving decisions in order to maximize their utility from con- 
sumption and money balances under the following budget constraint: 
00 MnP 
max Qt U ct t 
ct, MI, P, Mi Bt t_O \ 
Pt 
P 
sub Mt+Bt+Ptct = Mt-i+Rt-1Bt-i+Ptf 
(_L) L(2.1) 
where Mt = Mt P+ Mt represents the sum of non-productive (Mt P) and 
productive (Mt) money balances, Bt denotes bonds, Rt is the gross nominal 
return on bonds. Also, f (. ) is the production function, which depends on 
productive real money balances and a fixed input y, ct denotes real consump- 
tion and Pt is the price level. Finally, ß is the discount rate and U (. ) and 
f (. ) satisfy all the standard conditions2. I further assume that UCf1 > 0, that 
is consumption and money balances are Edgeworth complements3, where Ux 
is the partial derivative with respect to the argument x. In order to keep 
the analysis simple, the model abstracts from endogenous labor supply and 
capital accumulation. 
Policy rules. The Central Bank takes policy decisions consistent with 
a nonlinear Taylor rule: 
_+= 
A 
/ R-1 
Rt = P(lrt+: ) =1+ (R*- 1) 
7r I 
ý. 
(2.2) 
where art+i denotes a measure of inflation: in the case of a (perfect foresight) 
forecast-based Taylor rule we have that art+i = Etirt+l = 7rt+1. In the case of 
a backward-looldng policy rule, I set i=0, while it is a weighted average of 
current and past inflation rates, to be defined below. Also, 7r* is the inflation 
target chosen by the monetary authority and R* is the gross nominal interest 
rate consistent with the steady state Fisher relation: 
2See Benhabib (2001a). 
3See Benhabib et al. (2001b). 
24 CHAPTER 2. 
-17r` = R*. 
Optimality conditions. The representative agent chooses sequences 
of money, bonds and consumption so as to maximize intertemporal utility. 
Appendix A discusses the optimization problem in detail. The first order 
conditions of the representative agent's problem (2.1) give the following 
Euler equation: 
np 
Uc (ý, mt p) 
OUc 
+1mc+i 
(2.3) 
7rt 
where m= M/P denotes real money balances and an (implicit) money 
demand equation for both production and consumption money balances: 
fýºýn (mi) _' 
1 (2.4) 
Um^n (ct, m ') 
- 
Rt -1 (2.5) 
Üe (Ct, fnt p) R{ 
The assumptions about utility and production function guarantee that the 
demand for money gives a negative relation between real money demand and 
the nominal interest rate. Finally, in equilibrium markets clear and ci = yt. 
Role for Money. I consider two cases. First, money enters only in 
the utility function (MP = 0) and output is constant: f (. ) =y (i. e. it 
is an endowment economy). Second, money enters only in the production 
function (MP = 0)4 and the agents gain utility from consumption only. 
Perfect Foresight Solution. Independently of the assumptions about 
the role of money and the policy rule, the perfect foresight (reduced-form) 
solution of the model can be expressed as a first order nonlinear difference 
equation: 
7rt+i = F'(7rt)" (2.6) 
The particular solutions of the model (i. e. the form of the function F (. ) 
) for the different versions of the model are discussed in detail in the next 
sections. 
Calibration. Concerning the model with money in the production func- 
tion, I follow Benhabib et al. (2001b) and specify a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function and a CES production function: 
4In the sequel, I drop the superscript to avoid complications in the notation. 
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f (me) = I(1- a) m+ aye`]" (2.7) 
U(c) = 1- v. 
(2.8) 
Given those functional forms, I calibrate the model by using the equilibrium 
money demand: the benchmark calibration is shown in Table 15. In order 
to allow comparisons between the two models and match the data, I assume 
that in the model where money enters in the utility function the functional 
form is CES: 
µ1 (1-0) 
U(ct, mt)- \ý(1-a)ml 
+ýcý") 
(2.9) 
This specification allows the money demand implied by (2.4) and (2.5) to 
be exactly the same. Hence, the two models have the same calibration as 
shown in Table 1. 
Tablel Benchmark Parametrization 
Qµµ Lit µ 7r' R* VaA 
0.996 -9 -3.5 -50 1.0103 1.0143 1 0.000350 1.522 
The parameter ji is chosen to be consistent with both long run and short 
run log-elasticity of the money demand: IL LR is the parameter consistent 
with the long run log-elasticity of demand and µsR is consistent with the log- 
elasticity in the short run6. The parameters o, and a are `free' parameters7. 
2.2.1 Backward dynamics and learning 
In this paper I am mainly concerned with real time learning behavior and 
thus with the following (reduced-form) decision rule: 
ra = EG (lrt+1) (2.10) 
5For details on how to calibrate these models, see Benhabib et al. (2001b). 
6Notice that as I change the value of µ, I need also to change the value of a, in order 
to keep the model close to the data, see Benhabib et al. (2001b). 
7In the simulations below I consider values for o that range from 1 to 3.5, that are most 
commonly used in macroeconomic literature. Woodford uses u=6.3 which is somewhat 
higher. 
26 CHAPTER 2. 
where E is the (possibly not rational) expectations operator. Notice that 
this decision rule is consistent with the perfect foresight solution (2.6). In 
fact, under perfect foresight 7rt+l = G-' (7rt) = F(at). Depending on which 
model is considered and on the parameters, G might not be a function 
but a correspondence. In fact, in the next section I show the existence of 
two `branches' of G: this implies that for any future value of inflation, the 
decision rule gives two choices for current inflation. 
The existence of different `branches'8 of G poses the problem of how 
current inflation is decided, given the expectations about the future. In this 
paper I mainly focus on the local stability of the perfect foresight equilibria: 
I assume therefore that the expectational errors are `small' and that market 
participants are somewhat coordinated in a neighborhood of the perfect 
foresight equilibrium9. Nevertheless, I also consider the dynamics under 
learning and show the existence of other equilibria that depend on which 
branch of G is selected. 
According to (2.10), lrt depends only on future expected values of lrt+i 
In order to model learning behavior, I follow Guesnerie and Woodford (1991) 
and Evans and Honkapohja (2001a). The agents are assumed to have an (as- 
ymptotically) correct model of the economy: their perceived law of motion 
of the economy corresponds to the actual law of motion, if the learning 
process converges to the perfect foresight equilibrium. More specifically, the 
agents believe that the system is at the equilibrium, even though they do 
not know which equilibrium (steady state, cycle or sunspot) and what values 
of inflation correspond to the equilibrium. 
Concerning the monetary authority, for the case of forecast-based Taylor 
rules I maintain the assumption of perfect foresight. This assumption is 
restrictive but it is imposed to simplify the analysis. Nevertheless, relaxing 
this assumption might have consequences on my conclusions. The analysis 
of learning on part of the central bank is left as an issue for further research. 
Learning steady states and cycles. Let us first consider the deter- 
ministic case where the agents face two possible equilibria: steady states 
and (period-two) cycles. They expect 7rt = 7rl for odd-t and 7rt = m2 for 
even-t, where 7rl = a2 = it if the system is in steady state. (Notice that, as 
shown in Figure 1, each branch of G has a steady state. such that inflation is 
constant and G(7r) = 7r. ) Nevertheless, they do not observe 7rl and 7r2; they 
8For an example where the branches are in the forward-looking map, see Christiano 
and Harrison (1999). 
'Another way to express this is that the agents have strong priors about the equilibrium 
values of ir. 
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estimate them recursively, updating every period their information about 
the state of the system. Given that at the cycle: 
1r1=Gi(7r2); ir2=Gj(ir1) 
where i and j denote the (possibly different) branches of G, the agents esti- 
mate the two states of the cycle by averaging the past data G (7rt_i) for even 
and odd periods separately1°. Hence, their forecast will be EG, (lrt+i) = °2, t 
if t+1 is odd and EG5 (lrt+i) = Bi, t if t+1 is even, where Bt, t is an estimate of 
7rj (for 1=1,2). In order to update their estimates of the equilibrium values 
of inflation, market participants make use of the adaptive algorithm1l: 
01 1=f B1,8-1 1+ 
Ces 
( Ci (i2,8) - 91,8-1 1 (2.11) 
L 02, s JL 02,8-1 J I. C7 (Ifl, e) - 02, s-1 J 
where s is such that t= 2s +1 and 7rj,, = 7r2(8_l)+t, allowing the agent to 
consider the data in successive pairs. This learning rule has the desirable 
property of being consistent with both steady states and period-two cycles12. 
In fact, if the perfect foresight equilibrium is a steady state, the two estimates 
of the states 7rl and ßr2 converge to a single constantly. Also, the algorithm 
allows the agents to learn cycles14 on different branches of G. 
Given (2.10) and (2.11) the system can be expressed in terms of the 
expectations variable as15: 
1 01,8 el, 
s-1 
Gi (02, 
s-1) - 
e1, 
s-1 (2.12) 
e2, 
s 
-[ e2, 
s-1 
+ a, C'j (01, 
s) - 
02, 
s-1 
'°This learning mechanism implies a small deviation from rationality, since the agents 
are assumed to have a well specified model of the economy (the Minimum State Variable 
solution). 
"For details, see Evans and Honkapohja (1995,2001a). 
121n the sense that Olt -+ i1 and 02t -. as as t -+ oo. "Note that when considering a deterministic environment I assume that agents use a 
fixed gain algorithm: a. =aE (0,1). In the case of stochastic environment, the fixed 
gain algorithm does not converge, i. e. see Sargent (1999). I therefore assume for simplicity 
that a. = s-1. 
14 The simple models considered above can also generate perfect foresight equilibrium 
cycles of order higher than two. These cycles could not be detected by the learning rule 
above and therefore they are not learnable in this framework, but it would be straight- 
forward to modify the algorithm to include the possibility of learning higher order cycles. 
Nevertheless, this extension does not seem interesting because the results are not likely to 
be robust to behavioral and learning heterogeneity. On this point, see Bullard and Duffy 
(1998). 
"The dynamical system is obtained by substituting the first equation for 0,,, in the 
second equation. After this substitution, the system becomes 0. =H (0, _, 
), where 0. _ 
(01, ", 02, "). 
28 CHAPTER 2. 
which gives a two dimensional dynamical system at each branch i, j. Learn- 
ing behavior is determined by the behavior of this dynamical system. 
Learning sunspots. I also consider the possibility that agents learn 
to believe in sunspots. In fact, as shown in the next sections, under the 
hypothesis of rational expectations there exist sunspot equilibria. In order 
to assess their learnability, let us assume that the agents include in their 
perceived law of motion the possibility of being at a two-state sunspot equi- 
librium, generated by a non-fundamental exogenous `sunspot' process st- 
Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001a) I assume agents estimate recur- 
sively the states I1 and ire (depending on the current realization of st) by 
using the adaptive learning rule: 
ec, t = e1x-i + t-1Oi, c-i9l 1(7re-i - Oi, t-1 + ft-i) (2.13) 
QI, t = Ql, t-1 + t-1 (tl, t-1 - 41, t-1) 
which gives the following actual law of motion: 
7rt = iPi, t[ziiCs (O t) + (1- zii) G1(92, t)] + (2.14) 
+P2, t[(1 - z22)Gi 
(81. x) + z22Gj (02, t)] 
where, again, i and j denote the (possibly) different branches of G. The 
algorithm works as follows. The agents observe a sunspot Markov process 
st with two states and a transition matrix: 
z11 1- Z11 [1 
-z22 z 
They are assumed to know the transition matrix. They update recursively 
each estimate of irl (for 1=1,2) depending on the current state of the 
sunspot: the variable t, bi, t is equal to one if the sunspot process is in state 
1 
and zero otherwise. Also, ql, t represents the fraction of observations in state 
1 over the whole sample up to time t -1. Finally Olt represents the estimates 
of lrj in the two states of the sunspots and c is a measurement error i. i. d, 
with bounded support. 
Notice that the learning algorithm (2.13) is able to detect cycles and 
steady states, provided that the agents learn also about the transition prob- 
abilities16. In other words, the learning rule (2.11) is a special case of (2.13). 
18If zll and z22 are equal to one we have a steady state, while if zu and zn are equal 
to zero we have a cycle. 
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For simplicity I do not consider this extension, but it should be clear that 
the learning rules are kept distinct only for expository purposes. 
2.3 Forecast-based Taylor rule 
2.3.1 Local Stability of Steady States 
Given the dynamical system (2.12), the aim of this section is to verify local 
determinacy and learnability of the steady states, under both the assumption 
of money in the utility function and money in the production function. 
Money in the production function 
By using the equilibrium condition in the goods market, I get the following 
decision rule for the representative agent: 
U, (yt) =E 
{QU. 
(yt+i) 
[7rt+ L]I (2.15) 
l 
where E (. ) denotes the expectation operator. Combining the expression: 
Mt = f-1 (Vt) 
obtained from the production function and the money demand function (2.4) 
gives a negative relation between output and the interest rate: 
yt=y(Rt), y'<0 (2.16) 
Combining (2.15), (3.5), (2.16) with i=1,1 obtain: 
U. (y (P (lrt+1))) =E 
{ßuc 
(Y (P (lrt+2))) I 1P (7rt+1)11 (2.17) 
L lrt+1 JJ 
Assuming perfect foresight, the solution is a well defined one-dimensional 
map17 which takes the form of (2.6). This can be shown by rewriting: 
Uc (y (P (lrt+2))) = ß-'Uc (y (P (lrt+i))) 
P (7rt+i) 
J 
1-1 
(2.18) 
L ýt+1 
"As noted already in Benhabihb et al. (2001), the solution displays nominal indeter- 
minacy. 
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and noting that the function U. (y (p (n))) is invertible and its inverse is well 
defined. Linearizing the forward looking map around the active and passive 
steady states gives the coefficient": 
5t+2 =I1+ 
_oEY 
(Ep 
- 1JJ at+l 2.19) 
L 
where describes deviations from the steady state, Ep is the elasticity of 
R with respect to ir, -o =<0 and ey = %L < 0. Notice that for 
consistency with the assumptions about the utility 
function described in the 
previous section, I assume that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
is constant. 
The following proposition describes the steady states and their stability 
under perfect foresight and learning dynamics (all the proofs are in the 
Appendix). 
Proposition 12 Consider the map G implied by (2.17), such that 7rt = 
F-1(irt+i) = Girt+i). Then: 
(i) The system (2.12) has two steady states, 7' and T. At i' monetary 
policy is active and ep (7r*) > 1. At T monetary policy is passive and ep (r) < 
1. 
(ii) Provided e, (i`) is such that e,, (i') > 1_2 
of both the active and 
V- T passive steady states are locally determinate in the perfect foresight dynamics 
and stable under learning dynamics for any aE [0,11- 
Remark 13 By adding small noise and letting at = t'1 we have that both 
fixed points are strongly E-Stable in the sense of Evans and Honkapohja 
(2001) and thus they are robust to overpammetrized perceived laws of motion 
(i. e. if the agents' model were consistent with an n-cycle, it would still 
converge to the fixed point)19. 
The Proposition states that local determinacy and learnability of the 
inflation target equilibrium are achieved provided that the Taylor rule is 
`sufficiently active' at the inflation target. Under the benchmark calibration 
(with p= -9) in Table 1, condition (ii) is satisfied for aE (1,2.4). Notice 
that provided 0< jaeyI < 1/2 it is possible to find a sufficiently active Taylor 
rule that guarantees determinacy. Nevertheless, a policy rule that satisfy 
the Taylor Principle might not achieve local stability, i. e. ¬. >1 is not a 
"The result is also in Benhabib et aL (2001b) 
19See Proposition 12.2 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001). 
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Figure 2.1: 
sufficient condition for local determinacy and learnability. For example, the 
smaller the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/a, the more aggressive 
the Taylor rule should be. 
As mentioned in the introduction, I focus on the case where the inflation 
target is locally determinate. Concerning the steady states, forecast based 
rules can be destabilizing even in the case where the equilibrium correspond- 
ing to the inflation target is locally determinate and learnable. In fact, for 
suitable initial conditions (depending on the shocks hitting the economy and 
the state of expectations) the economy can be driven into a liquidity trap. 
We should expect the existence of a "stability corridor": if the economy ex- 
periences small shocks (i. e. in expectations), than the Taylor rule drives the 
economy back to the inflation target. On the contrary, large shocks might 
lead to a liquidity trap, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
In the next section I show that, if we take into account the existence of 
equilibrium cycles and sunspots, then the stability corridor is rather small. 
In fact, small shocks can drive the economy to sunspot equilibria arbitrarily 
close to the active steady state. 
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Money in the utility function 
In this case output is equal to a constant endowment V. Using the Euler 
equation (2.3) and the goods market condition: 
ct=J 
I obtain the decision rule: 
Uc (zi, rnt) = 
flu. (-Jr %h+1) Rt. (2.20) 
7rt+l 
From the demand equation (2.5) I get the following (real) money demand 
equation: 
mt =m (Rt) m<0 (2.21) 
Finally, using (2.20), (2.21), and (3.5) to substitute for R and 
m, I obtain the following reduced-form solution in 7r: 
Uc (y' m (P (lrt+1))) = 
QUc (ye m (P (7rt+2)))P (7rt+l). (2.22) 
7rt+l 
Once again, the solution is a well defined one dimensional dynamical system 
which takes the form of (2.6). 
Let us assume that Uß,,, 1 > 0: under this assumption, we know from the 
continuous time version of this model that the active steady state is locally 
determinate20. Linearizing the model (2.22) 1 get the following coefficient: 
it+2 =I1+1(! -111 at+i (2.23) LC ncm EP // J 
where 5r defines deviations from steady state, U-M >0 and ¬m _ 
mR < 0. 
It is immediate from (2.23) that the active steady state (cp (7r') > 1) 
is always determinate, while the determinacy of the passive steady state 
(c. (T) < 1) depends crucially on the parameters of the model. I also consider 
the existence and learnability of equilibrium stationary sunspots e-close to 
the deterministic steady states (defined c' - SSEs in the sequel). Local 
stability and learnability of the steady states are described as follows: 
20 See Benhabib et al. (2001a). 
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Proposition 14 Consider the map G implied by (2.22). The map has the 
same steady states as (2.17). Consider the deterministic system (2.12); 
(i) the active steady state is determinate and learnable for every aE 
(0,1); 
(ii) for EP(IC) such that c, (-7r) > 1+21c Em 
the passive steady state is 
indeterminate and non-learnable for every aE (0,1) ; 
(iii) for Ep(7f) such that EP(9C) < 1+2,., - 
the passive steady state is 
determinate and learnable for every aE (0,1). 
Consider the stochastic system (2.13), (2.14); 
(iv) for Ep(ik) such that 1+ EanEm 
> EP(T) > 1+2 E1, m 
there exist learn- 
+7. -, 
c- SSEs around the (indeterminate) passive steady state. 
Proposition (14) shows that also in the case, more common in the lit- 
erature, where money enters in the utility function, forecast-based Taylor 
rules may lead to economic instability, even if the active steady state is lo- 
cally determinate and learnable. In fact, the economy can either fall into a 
liquidity trap or converge to a sunspot equilibrium where inflation fluctuates 
around the passive steady state. A sufficiently aggressive rule at the inflation 
target leads to a very passive response at the liquidity trap (as it is apparent 
from the policy rule (3.5)). Hence, a sufficiently aggressive rule verifies the 
conditions for a learnable liquidity trap or a learnable sunspot. Concerning 
the empirical relevance of this result, learnability of the liquidity trap steady 
state or of the sunspots around it obtains for µ= -9 and a>2, under the 
benchmark calibration in Table 1. If we consider a more aggressive Taylor 
rule (i. e. A=2, which captures the estimated Taylor rule for the post- 
Volker era21), learnability of the passive steady state or sunspots around it 
is verified for an even larger parameter space. Hence, the economy can fall 
into a liquidity trap for very plausible parameter values. 
Summing up, these two results qualify the findings of Bullard and Mi- 
tra (2001) and McCallum (2001). These results where derived in somewhat 
different model environments and so should not be expected to apply in the 
current setting22. First, cP >1 (the Taylor Principle) is not a sufficient 
condition to stabilize the economy. The conditions in Proposition (14) show 
that a `too active' policy rule23 at the inflation target (which implies a too 
passive policy at the liquidity trap) might be destabilizing because it leads to 
21 See Clarida et al. (1999). 
22 This shows that the nature of the model does matter for results in this area, which is 
perhaps not surprising. 
23 Note that the optimal monetary policy literature advocates more active Taylor rules 
(i. e. ep) than our benchmark case, see Taylor (1999). 
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learnable liquidity traps. Also, from Proposition (12) we know that a `too' 
cautious active policy rule leads to an indeterminate and non-learnable infla- 
tion target equilibrium, while the liquidity trap is learnable. The conclusion 
is that uncertainty about the correct specification of the model with respect 
to the role of money balances makes forecast-based Taylor rules potentially 
destabilizing. 
Second, regardless of how the model is formulated with respect to the 
role of money, liquidity traps are, in some cases, robust to expectational 
mistakes24. 
2.3.2 Stability of Cycles and Sunspots: Money in the Pro- 
duction Function 
The results discussed in the previous section are based on linearization and 
therefore have only local validity. As Shown already in Benhabib et al. 
(2001b, 2002) there may be other equilibria under perfect foresight. In 
this section I consider the local stability of these equilibria. The scope 
of the analysis is to assess the theoretical relevance of the model's global 
indeterminacy. I therefore proceed to evaluate the learnability of other 
perfect-foresight equilibria like cycles and sunspots. I focus on the case 
where money enters in the production function for two main reasons. First, 
as argued in Benhabib et al. (2002) this is likely to be the most relevant case, 
because a large part of money demand in the U. S. comes from firms. Second, 
this is the case in which the Taylor rule is potentially more destabilizing, 
because cycles and sunspots exist close the inflation target equilibrium. 
Concerning the model with money in the production function, under 
the benchmark calibration (with It = -9) the map under perfect foresight 
has a cycle of period 2, for (approximately) aE (1,2.42)25. The economy 
fluctuates between two states of higher and lower inflation, with respect to 
the inflation target. Figure 2.2 shows the period-two cycle for a given value 
of a, under both F and G. 
The thick lines correspond to the branches of the (backward) map G; the 
thin line describes the second iterate of the map at+2 =F (lrt+i) in forward 
dynamics and the dashed line shows the first iterate of the map in forward 
dynamics. As shown in Figure 1, the correspondence G -implied by the map 
(2.17)- is made up of two `branches'. The first, G1, intersects the 45 degree 
24The result also contrasts with Honkapohja and Mitra (2001). They analyze Markov 
sunspots equilibria and show that none is learnable in a class of models with money in 
the utility function and nominal rigidities. 
25 See Benhabib et al. (2001b). 
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line at the passive steady state while G2 intersects the 45 degree line at the 
active steady state. 
Backward (G) and forward (F) maps are equal at the fixed point and at 
the equilibrium cycle (shown by the dotted line). Notice that each point of 
the cycle rests on a different branch of the backward map. Nevertheless, it 
is immediate to see that at the cycle: 
11 
G1 (7rH) =i C2 (7rL) = j(lrL) F1 (lrH) 
where 7rH corresponds to the point of the cycle where inflation is higher 
than the inflation target, while 7rL is the point where inflation is lower than 
the target. Hence, local stability of the cycle under learning can be studied 
from the local properties of F. 
Let us consider Figure 3. It describes the map F, 2,: the different curves 
show how the cycle changes for varying a. 
From the picture we know that the map FQ admits a cycle for certain 
values of a. Consider aE (1.5,2.5): there exists v such that for a<Q<2.5, 
FQ has four fixed points. For a>v FQ has two fixed points. 
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From the observation of Figures 2.2 and 2.3 and from the form of the 
policy rule26, it is possible to conclude the following: 
1. at the point on the cycle where inflation is high (7rH), monetary policy 
is always active; 
2. the degree of aggressiveness of the monetary rule at this point decreases 
as the two-period cycles gets closer to the active steady state and 
subsequently vanishes by "merging" with the fixed point; 
3. as a increases, the cycle gets closer to the fixed point and eventually 
disappears. Instead, for low values of a, the point of the cycle where 
inflation is low (irL) is close to the passive steady state and thus the 
policy rule is passive. But, as a -º v we have that e1, (lrL) -º Ep (a`) 
and it exists ao such that for a< ao, cp(7rL) > 1. 
Given the existence of a cycle, using well known results from Azari- 
adis and Guesnerie (1986), Grandmont (1987) and Evans and Honkapohja 
26Notice that changes in o do not affect the policy rule. 
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(2001a) it is possible to show that sunspot equilibria exist close to the period 
two cycle and to the determinate active steady state27. Finally, notice that 
the qualitative features of the map, described above, are robust to small 
changes in the parameters. The following result is thus robust to small 
deviations from benchmark parameters. 
Proposition 15 Let G be given by (2.17). 
(i) Given the deterministic system (2.12), under the benchmark calibra- 
tion, there exist values a and a, < `v) such that for a<Q the cycle is 
stable under learning for every -a E (0,1). For a>v the cycle is unstable 
under learning for every aE (0,1). For aE [Q, är] there exists äo E (0,1) 
such that for a<& the cycle is stable under learning, while for a> äQ the 
cycle is unstable under learning2s. 
Given the stochastic system (2.13) and (2.14); 
(ii) for a<ä there exist learnable c- SSEs relative to the deterministic 
cycle; 
(iii) for any 1<a<U, let in (a) E (ir`, irrt (a)) and i2 (v) < irL (a), 
where 7rH (a) , 7rL 
(a) represent the equilibrium cycle, for given a. Then 
there exist z11, Z22 such that the sunspot equilibrium (71 (a) , 72 
(a) 
, z11, z22) 
is learnable (whether or not the cycle is learnable). 
Remark 16 Given the standard calibration a more active policy rule (say 
A= 2) implies the existence of learnable cycles for a wider range of a (in 
the simulations cycles are learnable for values of a 2.5)29. 
Remark 17 Using Proposition 12.7 and 12.9 in Evans and Honkapohja 
(2001a) it is possible to show that sunspots constructed on the active and 
passive steady state exists and are learnable if and only if IG. (n1 (a)) I<1 
and IGi(ir2 (v))I <1 which is verified under the condition in Proposition 
(12). 
Remark 18 It is straightforward to show that under the benchmark calibra- 
tion the inflation target steady state is determinate and learnable. In fact, 
as a decreases both the stability conditions for the learnability of cycles and 
steady states are satisfied. 
2TSee Appendix B for details. 
28 Evans and Honkapohja (1995) show the existence of noisy REE cycles that are learn- 
able if the deterministic cycle is learnable, provided the learning parameter is decreasing 
over time (i. e. a'1 is used instead of a). Hence, the results in Proposition (15) are robust 
to the introduction of small noise. 
29Also, more active Taylor rule imply period three cycles and chaos for a wider range 
of parameters than found in Benhabib et al. (2001b). 
38 CHAPTER 2. 
The Proposition leads to two interesting results. First, it shows that the 
inflation target and the equilibrium cycle and sunspots around it are both 
learnable. The implication for monetary policy is that small shocks are suf- 
ficient to destabilize the economy. Small deviations from the active steady 
state might lead the market participants to coordinate on a equilibrium cy- 
cle. Second, very active policy rules (i. e. A>1.5), that are commonly 
obtained from optimal monetary policy design, can be destabilizing, given 
that they imply learnable cycles and sunspots for a wider range of parame- 
ters. 
Empirical validity. Consider the two following examples. Concerning 
the stability of cycles, Proposition (15) implies that if 7TL is not too close to 
the inflation target, than the cycle is stable under learning, at least for some 
values of the parameter a. Under the benchmark calibration30 we have that 
ä . ^: 2 and F 2.182. For example, we have that for a=2.18,7tH = 4.7% 
while 7rL = 3.2%, and ep (7rL) = 1.18, which implies a mildly active policy. 
This equilibrium is learnable for a<0.21. Given that the target is 4.2%, 
the cycle is `close' to the active steady state. 
Concerning the stability of sunspots, result (iv) is new in the literature. 
I construct the sunspots on different branches of G -see Appendix B. For 
example, it can be shown that for a=1.9, the SSE given by 7rl = 1.0104 
(4.25% in annual terms), ßr2 = 1.0075 (3%), x11 = 0.2, Z22 = 0.3 is learnable. 
Note that 7rl .:: ire. Moreover, assuming a=2.35, for which the cycle 
is indeterminate and non-learnable, the SSE given by it = 1.046 (6%), 
7r2 = 1.0087(3.5%), x11 = 0.19, x22 = 0.25 is learnable and `close' to the 
deterministic cycle. Note that in both the inflation states monetary policy 
is active. 
Dynamics under learning. By considering explicitly the functional 
forms of the model, it is also possible to give an intuition about the dy- 
namics under learning. Figure 2.1 shows the convergence process of (2.10) 
to the active steady state and the liquidity trap, under the hypothesis of 
perfect foresight, to give an idea of how the economy can fall into a liquidity 
trap. A shock can start the economy on the deflationary path, depending 
on how the agents react to their expectations (i. e. which branch of G we 
are considering). In this case the economy converges monotonically to the 
new equilibrium. Instead, convergence to the central bank's target implies 
fluctuations in the inflation rate. 
30For small changes of the other parameters, such as the degree of policy aggressiveness, 
6 and ä also change. 
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Proposition (15) concerns the learnability of equilibrium cycles obtained 
under perfect foresight. But learning dynamics also generates other equilib- 
ria along bifurcation parameter values31 of the system (2.12). As the cycle 
loses stability and a increases, it is likely that a saddle-node bifurcation oc- 
curs. Hence, given Q as the bifurcation parameter, for some a<Q the fixed 
point of the second iterate of (2.12) is surrounded by two other fixed point 
(i. e. two cycles of period 2). One of them is stable, and the other is unstable. 
For a>Q the fixed point disappears (as we also see it from the graph). 
Also, the cycle looses stability as a increases for given aE ra, -6]. In 
this case a period-doubling bifurcation might occur, generating a period four 
cycle that can be either stable or unstable. Note that these other filed points 
do not exist under perfect foresight. They are generated by the learning be- 
havior. Hence, forecast-based rules have the potential to further de-stabilize 
the economy if we take into account the dynamics under learning32. 
This result is important in its simplicity because it shows the possibility 
of learnable equilibria, other than the inflation target, for any parameter 
value of v for which the cycle exists33. Even though we have local determi- 
nacy and learnability of the inflation target equilibrium, the agents learning 
process can still converge to a sunspot equilibrium that is `close' to it. This 
also means that the `stability corridor' mentioned in the previous section 
is indeed extremely small if it exists at a1134. Hence, forecast-based Taylor 
rules are likely to be destabilizing, under this model of the economy35. 
31 Note that, given the standard parametrization of the model, the eigenvalues at the 
fixed points are real (and with opposite sign), while the eigenvalues at the cycle are complex 
when stable and real-saddle (with one eigenvalue greater than one) when unstable. In 
particular, the eigenvalues are real before becoming unstable. Also, for vE (ä, ö) the cycle 
loses stability as a increases and, again, the change in stability involves real eigenvalues. 
The ustable cycle is a saddle with one eigenvalues less than minus one. 
32 These bifurcations occur only if extra conditions are satisfied, see Wiggins (1990). 
More precisely, the problem can be reduced to a one dimensional bifurcation through a 
center manifold reduction. But we do not go further in the analysis. 
"Sunspot equilibria may seem a more empirically plausible explanation for the insta- 
bility generated by the Taylor rule. In fact, the regular behavior implied by deterministic 
cycles is not observed in the data. 
s4Christiano and Rostagno (2001) and Benhabib et al. (2001c) propose to shift to a 
money growth rule if the observed inflation deviates consistently from target, so to avoid 
other equilibria, like a liquidity trap. This solution would not be helpful in our case 
because cycles and sunspot equilibria can be very close to the active fixed point. Thus, 
such a scheme would eliminate the stabilization properties of the Taylor rule. 
"Simulations show that the result is unchanged if I consider different inflation targets. 
For example the (implicit) inflation target for the European Central Bank would be 7r' _ 
2%: Proposition (3) holds also in this case. 
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2.3.3 Money in the utility function 
Because of our uncertainty about the `correct' model of the economy, it is 
useful to consider the behavior of the forecast-based Taylor rule when money 
enters in the utility function36. In order to allow comparisons between the 
two models and match the data I assume that, in the model where money 
enters in the utility function the functional form is CES: 
(1 (1-0) 
U(ýtýmt) = 
lý(1-a)mt 
+a `]µ) 
(2.24) 
This specification allows the money demand implied by (2.16) and (2.21) to 
be exactly the same. Hence, the two models have the same calibration as 
shown in Table 1. 
We know from Proposition (14) that the stability of the fixed point, for a 
given Taylor rule, depends on the elasticities This is also true for the 
global dynamics of the system. It is easy to show that ewe,,, is increasing in 
both o, and p. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the map under different values of a 
and p. First, notice that if I use values for µ close to the short run value, no 
cycle exists, as shown in Figure 2.5. This is good news, but we know from 
Proposition (14) that for not too low, there exist learnable sunspots 
around the indeterminate and non-learnable passive steady state. 
For example, if we fix it = -9 and choose a>2 than the conditions for 
the existence of learnable sunspots are verified. Hence, the economy can fall 
into a liquidity trap for very plausible parameter values. 
A period two cycle emerges as both p and o, increase. Given the uncer- 
tainty about these parameters I consider a choice of p< 11's and o, <4 as 
plausible parameter values. For example, for p= -3.5 and v=3.1 (and 
the other parameters at their benchmark values) there exists a cycle around 
the passive steady state, as shown in Figure 2.4. The result holds for higher 
p and it is robust to parameter perturbation. For lower pp the values of or 
required to get the cycle are not interesting. But also in this case, a too 
active monetary policy is further destabilizing. For example, if A=2, then 
the cycle appears for p= -9 and a>1.5. Given that A=2 has 
been 
suggested to describe the policy stance of the post-Volker period37, the ex- 
istence of cycles holds for a large portion of the `plausible' parameter space. 
36Carltrom and Fuest (2001a) point out the fact that the way money enters in the 
utility functions has important implications for the stability properties of the Taylor rule. 
I consider the standard approach in this section and a different trading environment in 
the extensions. 
37See Clarida et al. (2001). 
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The results are described in the following Proposition. Again, the results 
remain valid for small deviations from the benchmark parametrization. 
Proposition 19 Let G given by (2.22) and under the benchmark parame- 
trization but with A=2, such that for a> -' a period-two cycle exists. 
Under the deterministic system (2.12); 
(i) for -' <a<ö the cycle is not learnable under rule (2.11) for any 
value of aE (0,1) ; 
(ii)foraE(& 
,&), 
a' < &, there exists an &' such that for every a< 
the cycle is learnable; 
(iii) for a>Q the cycle is learnable for every aE (0,1). 
Under the stochastic system (2.13) and (2.14); 
(iv) for a>ö there exist learnable SSE c-close to the cycle. For a> v' 
the sunspots are robust to agent's overparametrization. 
(v) there exist learnable `liquidity trap' sunspots e-close to the two fixed 
points. 
Remark 20 Under the benchmark parametrization &'; -- 2.23 and 
& 2.89. 
Again, changing the parameters affects &, 6. It is straightforward to verify 
42 
1.01 
1.009 
1.008 
1.007 
1.006 
1.005 
1.004 
1.003 
1.002 
CHAPTER 2. 
sigma=2.1 mu=-9 
Active ss 
G 
F 
Passive ss inflation 
1.002 1.003 1.004 1.005 1.006 1.007 1.008 1.009 1.01 
Figure 2.5: 
that under the benchmark parametrization, the inflation target, the liquidity 
trap, the cycle and the sunspots are all locally stable under learning. 
Remark 21 Even if a formal proof is omitted for brevity, it can be shown 
that also for the case of money in the utility function there exist learnable 
sunspots that are `close' to an indeterminate and non-learnable cycle. As- 
sume that a=1.8 and A=2, while the other parameters are set according 
to Table I. Let us consider the following equilibrium: irl = 1.002 (0.08%), 
1t2 = 0.9975 (-0.1%), with zil = 0.15, z22 = 0.15. This is relatively close to 
the indeterminate and non-learnable cycle where high inflation is irj = 1.001 
(0.04%) and low inflation is iL = 0.997 (-0.12%). The economy fluctuates 
among almost zero inflation and negative inflation. It can be shown numer- 
ically, by using (54) in the Appendix, that this sunspot is learnable. Hence, 
also for the case of money in the utility function I conjecture the existence 
of learnable sunspots for all values of a such that the cycle exists. 
The results are obtained with the same procedure as for the model with 
money in the production function and the proof is therefore omitted. Also 
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in this model, forecast-based Taylor rules can be destabilizing: the economy 
can converge to equilibria in which inflation fluctuates below the target. 
Concluding, uncertainty about the correct model of the economy and the 
parameter a makes a forecast-based Taylor rule a hazardous choice. In fact, 
if the `true a', which the Central Bank is not likely to observe, is sufficiently 
low and the economy is better approximated by a model with money in the 
production function, then forecast-based Taylor rules are going to be desta- 
bilizing. On the other side, if the true a is sufficiently high and the `correct' 
model has money in the utility function we get the same conclusion. Hence, 
whatever is the `estimate' of a that it is used for calibration, there exist 
a model of the economy for which the forecast-based Taylor rule generates 
instability. 
2.4 Backward-Looking Taylor Rule 
In this section I argue that the instability generated by a forecast-based 
Taylor rule can be completely eliminated by shifting to a Taylor rule that 
reacts to current and past inflation. In fact, I show that such a policy rule 
improves on the forward looking rule in two important ways. 
First, for plausible calibrations, the economy does not have equilibrium 
cycles. Second, a backward-looking policy rule reverses the stability prop- 
erties of the liquidity trap and sunspots, leaving a unique learnable equilib- 
rium: the inflation target. 
Let us consider the case where the central bank responds to inflation 
with some inertia. This is justified in Woodford (2002) and Benhabib et al. 
(2001a) as a more plausible description of central banks' operating rules38. 
In this case the central bank is assumed to react to an exponential moving 
average of current and past inflation rates that takes the form: 
00 
Wt = (1- ö) 
E8i-7rt-i (2.25) 
=o 
where 0<5<1 defines how much weight is given to current inflation, as is 
easily seen by re-writing (2.25) as: 
Ft = (1- 6)irt + 5t-1. (2.26) 
s" "In practice, monetary policy will never involve feedback from an instantaneous rate 
of inflation [... ], because available inflation measures will always be time-averaged over at 
least a period such as a month". Woodford (2002), Chapter 2, p. 44. 
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By taking art as the inflation measure to which the central bank reacts, we 
can write the Taylor reaction function as: 
Rt =1+ (R* - 1) (2.27) 
The next sub-sections evaluate the properties of this rule under the two 
models used in the previous sections. 
2.4.1 Money in the production function 
Under the Taylor rule (2.27), the reduced-form model becomes": 
Uc (1/ (P (mot))) =E 
{Q 
(1- 8) U., (y (P (mot+i))) P 
(f t)} (2.28) 
[Tt+ 
1- ýt J 
Local stability and learnability conditions are considered in the following 
Proposition: 
Proposition 22 Let G be given by (2.28). Given the system (2.12), as- 
sume; 
QC max - 
(EP 
(7r*) Ey (T))_1 1 (C. 11 
(1-6) ' 2EY(f) 
1+(7ri)l ý2. Z9 
(i) Then the inflation target is determinate and learnable for every a, 
while the passive steady state is indeterminate and non-learnable for every 
a. Moreover, condition (2.29) is verified for every parameter value that gives 
a locally determinate inflation target under the forecast-based Taylor rule. 
(ii) given the benchmark calibration, for it E (t SR, pLR), no cycles exist 
around the active steady state; 
Given the system (2.13), (2.14); 
(iii) There exist e- SSEs around the indeterminate passive steady state 
but they are unstable under learning. 
(iv) for any a, there exists b' such that (2.29) holds; 
"In both models, the solution for the backward looking Taylor rule is a non invertible 
(in both the forward and backward dynamic) one dimensional difference equation. Also, 
by computing the map numerically, it is possible to notice that both steady state belong 
to the same branch. The second branch either does not exist or it exists for values of the 
inflation rate that do not make economic sense. 
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Remark 23 Note that under the (implausible) case where b=0, statements 
(i)-(iii) hold for values of it E (j ', 11 LR) and for 3.5 >a>1, provided" 
A 
jjL. <2.3. 
Remark 24 Prom condition (2.29), the set of parameters which lead to local 
determinacy under the backward-looking Taylor rule is larger than for the 
forecast-based Taylor rule. Also, the set of parameters for which (i), (ii) and 
(iii) hold increases for more backward-looking policy rules (ö -º 1). 
Remark 25 By simulating the map numerically, it can be shown that no 
cycles exist for the mentioned parameter values. 
The Proposition says that if the policy rule is sufficiently backward- 
looking, then it guarantees a unique learnable equilibrium, i. e. a unique 
equilibrium that it is robust to expectational mistakes. Hence, it is always 
possible to find a policy rule that is sufficiently backward-looking to stabilize 
the economy41. 
2.4.2 Money in the utility function 
The reduced-form under the backward-looking rule (2.27) becomes: 
U. (y, m (P (mot))) = 
QUo (y, m (P (wt+i ))) (1- b) P (fit) . 
(2.30) 
't+l - bit 
The stability properties of the Taylor rule are discussed in the following 
Proposition. 
Proposition 26 Let G be given by (2.30). Given the system (2.11) we have 
that for any parameter value; 
(i) the active steady state is determinate and learnable for any aE (0,1); 
(ii) the passive steady state is indeterminate and non-learnable for any 
aE (0,1); 
(iii) no cycles exist around the active steady state; 
"Notice that the last condition must hold only in the worse case where µ= µLR 
and o=3.5. With these parameter values the elasticity of output with respect to the 
interest rate at the passive steady state is very high in absolute value. Under the standard 
parametrization the condition becomes R< 121 
"Also a contemporaneous Taylor rule guarantees a unique equilibrium, for plausible 
parameter values. 
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Given the system (2.13), (2.14); 
(iii) there exist ¬- SSE sunspot equilibria around the passive steady 
state but they are not learnable. 
Remark 27 By simulations it is possible to show that no cycles exist, given 
that the map C is monotonic. 
The proof of the Proposition (26) follows the same steps as for Proposi- 
tion (25) and it is therefore omitted for brevity42. Also for the case of money 
in the utility function, if the central bank responds to a weighted average 
of current and past inflation rates there exists a unique equilibrium that is 
stable under learning: the inflation target. 
Concluding, from the Propositions (25) and (26) it is apparent that more 
backward-looking Taylor rules should be preferred to forecast-based rules for 
the following reasons: 1) they eliminate the possibility that adverse shocks 
might lead the economy to a liquidity trap, where the inflation target is 
systematically missed; 2) they reduce possible sources of instability in the 
economic system, generated by equilibrium fluctuations around the inflation 
target; 3) they increase model robustness, given that the parameter values 
for which we obtain a unique learnable equilibrium is increased. Notice also 
that the results arc obtained allowing uncertainty about what the correct 
model of the economy should be, at least concerning the role of money: in 
fact the results are robust to both specifications of the model. 
Finally, the results obtained with this model seem to be in contrast with 
Bullard and Mitra (2001). They find that a policy rule that reacts to lagged 
inflation is potentially destabilizing, i. e. could give rise to local indetermi- 
nacy or instability under learning. Instead, under rule (2.25) the Central 
Bank reacts also to current inflation. This might explain the different con- 
clusion843 
"The interested reader should see Eusepi (2002). 
'3 It could be argued that having the central bank reacting to lagged inflation rates is 
more plausible, given Its information constraints. Nevertheless, the model under perfect 
foresight is solved under the assumption that both the Central Bank and the private sector 
observe current inflation. Rule (2.25) Is consistent with this assumption. 
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2.5 Extensions 
2.5.1 Cash In Advance Constraint (CIA) 
Let us consider a different trading environment as in Carlstrom and Fuest 
(2001b). They show that under CIA timing the stability of the model un- 
der a Taylor rule dramatically changes. Under a forecast-based Taylor rule 
determinacy is achieved by a passive policy stance. The goal of this para- 
graph is to show that, on the contrary, the previous results are robust to a 
modification in the trading environment. 
In the simplest case of an endowment economy, the budget constraint 
becomes: 
Me+i = Me +T+Th-1Re-i - Be - Pecs +Pay 
and the CIA constraint is: 
At = Mt +r+ Bt-, Rt-i - Bt 
where At denotes the liquidity available to the representative agent in the 
current period. Substituting back the CIA constraint in the utility func- 
tional (defined over current consumption and real liquidity) and solving the 
optimization under the resource constraint we obtain a money demand equa- 
tion: 
at=1I(Rc) 111 <0 
and the following reduced-form: 
U. (c, Ii (Th)) = Uc (c, 11 (P (Th+i))) --ý 1P 
(Ie+1) . (2.31) 
In the following Proposition I compare the stability properties of forecnst- 
based and backward-looking Taylor rules. As above, I consider the most 
favorable case where the rules lead to local determinacy and I study the 
possibility of learnable equilibria other than the inflation target. Where 
needed, the functional form for the utility function is CES. This leads to a 
demand for money that is equivalent to the case of money in the production 
function. 
Proposition 28 Let G be given by the CIA model. Assume: 
IEc, 
nE1/I >21 Ep 
1+ 
iJ (2.32) 
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where ell denotes the elasticity of the demand for money. Under the forecast- 
based Taylor rule; 
(i) the active steady state is determinate and learnable for every a, under 
the learning rule (2.11); 
(ii) the passive steady state is determinate and learnable for every a; 
(iii) there exists Ep (7r') consistent with (2.32) such that for Ep (9r') > 
ep (7r') there exist learnable cycles and t' - SSE around the active steady 
state, under the learning rules (2.11) and (2.13) respectively; 
Under the back-ward-looking Taylor rule; 
(iv) the active steady state is determinate and learnable for every a and 
no cycles or sunspots exist around it for jE (µsß, µLR) , under the learning 
rules (2.11) and (2.13) respectively; 
(v) the passive steady state is indeterminate and non-learnable for every 
a under rule (2.11); there exist c' - SSE sunspots around it but they are 
not learnable under (2.13). 
(vi) for any value of Ec+Eff, it exists d' such that (iv) and (v) hold; 
Remark 29 A forecast-based policy rule that is aggressive enough to satisfy 
(2.32) exists provided the elasticity of money demand is not too low (i. e. 
2.5. EXTENSIONS 49 
µ --# µLR). Condition (2.32) is verified for quite high values of A. Under 
the most favorable condition (a -+ 1 and p -º lpSZ) there exists A<3 for 
which the condition holds. 
Remark 30 As for Proposition 5, it is possible to show the existence of 
learnable sunspots around indeterminate and non-learnable cycles. Consider 
the following example, as shown in Figure 2.6. Set µ=1 SR, v=1.01, 
A=3.2 and the other parameters as in Table I. Then the sunspot equilibrium 
7ri = 1.0117 (4.7%), 7r2 = 1.0068 ('2.7%) and zll = 0.027, z22 = 0.19 is 
learnable. It is relatively close to the indeterminate and non-learnable cycle 
where high inflation 7r jj = 1.0118 (4.8%) and low inflation aL = 1.0071 
(2.8%'04. 
Remark 31 Figures 2.7,2.8 make clear the result in (iv), for a given para- 
metrization. It is immediate to see that the cycle appears only as the active 
steady state becomes indeterminate and thus (2.32) is violated. 
Remark 32 Also in this case, the properties of the backward-looking Taylor 
rule are preserved for a wider set of parameter values than implied by con- 
dition (2.32): in other words, a backward-looking Taylor rule is stabilizing 
also for parameter values that imply indeterminacy under a forrcast-based 
rule. Also, a more backward-looking rule (higher b) increases the parameter 
space for which (iv) and (v) hold -see the proof of (vi). 
FiguresV), Z$) give an example of the possible equilibria in the two 
cases. It is apparent that also in a different trading environment, forecast- 
based Taylor rules generate instability45: a too passive policy generates local 
indeterminacy, while a too active policy leads to multiple learnable equilib- 
ria around the locally determinate and stable inflation target equilibrium. 
Instead, shifting to a sufficiently backward looking rule guarantees a unique 
equilibrium. Hence, changing the trading environment does not reverse my 
results. 
"In this case the stability conditions are calculated numerically, given that the map is 
not invertible both in backward and forward dynamics. 
"We know from Carlstrom and Fluest (2001b) that a passive forward-looking Taylor rule 
achieves local determinacy. Nevertheless, It can be shown that a too passive Taylor rule 
leads to learnable 'inflationary traps'. The economy converges to a sunspot equilibrium 
where inflation fluctuates at hyperinflationary levels. 
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2.5.2 The model with sticky prices 
Let us consider endogenous labor supply, monopolistic competition and price 
stickiness. In this section I show that a contemporaneous Taylor rule (8 = 0) 
maintains the 'good' properties described In the previous sections. I analyze 
the latter case for analytical simplicity, but it Is also the least favorable para- 
tnctrization to study the stability properties of a backdvard-looking Taylor 
rule, If prices are flexible. Nevertheless, Benhabib ct at. (2002) find, in a 
continous time version of the sticky price model, that instability can arise 
under perfect foresight, even if backward-looking rules are adopted. A study 
of the discrete time model with d>0 implies a throe dimensional system 
and It is left to further rescarch/0. 
I use a simplified version of the standard model considered in the litera- 
turo on Taylor rules, sec Woodford (1999)47. The consumer-producer solves 
the following Intcrtcrnporal problem: 
1*1t Is not immediate to extend the result in continous time to the discrete time model, 
because of timing Issues. Also, there is the question of the learnability of the other 
equilibria that are discussed in IIenhabib et al. (2002). 
The model 1s a discrete time version of Denhabib et al. (2001a, b). 
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where V (. ) represents the disutility from labor and 0 captures the cots 
of price revisions. Finally r is a transfer from the governmeant. As in the 
previous sections, I consider both cases of money In the production function 
and money in the utility function. 
Money in tue utility function 
Given the equilibrium condition: 
f (heºmg) = }add(-) ci (2.34) 
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and the problem (3.3) we obtain the following first order conditions: 
Uc (ct, mt) =ß 
Uc (ct+l, mt+1) ft (2.35) 
lTt+1 
U. (ct, +nc) = U. (ct, 'mt) 
(Rtt 1) (2.36) 
o (7rt - 7r") 7rt =e (7rt+l - 7r') in+l + 
+ctUU (ct, mt) 77 
(1 + 77 
- 
z' (he) 
nf (he)U(ct, mt))(2.37) 
which define respectively the consumption Euler equation, the money de- 
mand and the price setting equation (which generates a version of the 
Phillips curve). From (2.34), (2.35) and (2.36) it is possible to express ct as 
a function of mt and Ißt. By substituting it in both the Euler equation and 
the Phillips curve, and by using the contemporaneous Taylor rule, I obtain 
a two dimensional dynamical system in iri and ct. It is possible to show 
that the system is well defined under perfect foresight, under the functional 
form specification described above48. But, as in the case of flexible prices, 
the backward dynamics is not well defined. For this reason, I restrict the 
analysis to the local stability of the system under learning. 
Money in the production function 
In this case the first order conditions become: 
Uc (ct) = ßUc 
(ct+t) Rt (2.38) 
7rt+i 
Uc (c) 
(Rt -1) = 
zt (ht) fm (ht, int) (2.39) Jig fh (ht, mt) 
0 (7ri - 7r') 7re =0 (7re+i - 7r*) 7re+i +' 
(he) 
(2.40) (1+11 
1 f'(hc)Uo(ct) 
"Notice that the money demand equation that we obtain from the FOC has the same 
specification that the one obtained under flexible prices, thus allowing for the same cali- 
bration. 
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By using the equilibrium condition c4 =j (he, mg) and equations (2.38) and 
(2.39) it is possible to express ht and rng both as a function of cc and Rt. By 
substituting these expressions into the Euler equation and the Phillips curve 
and using the Taylor rule we obtain a two dimensional dynamical system in 
ai and ct. Also in this case, it is possible to show that it is well defined in 
forward dynamics49 but not in backward dynamics. 
Learning and Simulation Results 
Unlike in the previous sections, it is not possible to give analytical results. 
Therefore, I study the stability properties of the system by numerical sim- 
ulations. I consider a grid of plausible parameters' values: it is described in 
the Table 2 below50. The other parameters are left at benchmark values. 
Table 2 
Param. Min Max 
ii -50 -3.5 
v 1.001 5 
0 35 350 
A 1.4 3 
Cycles and complex behavior. Under perfect foresight there is no 
evidence of local bifurcations and cycles around the active and passive steady 
states, in both cases of money in the production function and money in the 
utility function, for the parameter values described in the Table 2. As in the 
continuous time case51, the active steady state is a source and the passive 
steady state is a saddle. For no parameter values the active steady state 
or the passive steady state reverse their stability so that I exclude local 
bifurcations. Under perfect foresight there is global indeterminacy as in 
Benhabib et al. (2001), so that, after a small shock, the economy might 
converge to a liquidity trap. Are these equilibria robust to expectational 
mistakes? 
Learnability of the steady states. The model under backward dy- 
namics can be represented as follows: 
"This is achieved by imposing the restriction that the die-utlility from labor I. described 
by a linear function. If this restriction is not satisfied, then also the forward map Is a 
correspondence. 
"'Notice that these parameter values include the case where U.,,, <o, 
"Described in Benhabib et al. (2001b). 
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Having excluded the existence of cycles under perfect foresight, I simplify 
the analysis by restricting to the possibility of learning steady states. Bence, 
under the (asymptotically correct) agents' perceived low of motion, the econ- 
o: ny evolves as (ce, lrg) = (cu), where the-denotes a steady state value. 
Since the steady state values are unknown, the agents use the following 
simple rule to estimate them recursively: 
Of' = o-1 +a (Cl (O't-1, ©J 1) - Bi-1) 
OR = ©i 1+a (C2 (Vi-1, ©t 1) - ©ý 1) (2.41) 
whero 0° is the estimate for c, 0* is the estimate for if, and a is the learning 
parameter, as in the last sections. In order to study the lcarnability of the 
steatly states, I linearize the backward map around the active and passive 
steady state and I evaluate the stability under learning for various parameter 
values (including a). The linearized system can be written as52: 
f We = DCEt-1 
I 
Ft+ +i 
and local stability under learning depends on: 
j_ aDG12 (2 42) 
aDG21 1+a (DC22 -1) 
[i+Q(DG1'-') 
Simulations show that the active steady state is learnable for every ae 
(0,1). On the other side, the passive steady state is never learnable for any 
tic e (0,1). The liquidity trap that the model predicts under the assumption 
of perfect foresight is not robust to learning. Moreover, using a result from 
Ilonknpoltja and Mitra (2001) 1 can exclude, from the numerical simulations, 
the existence of learnable sunspots around the passive steady states53. 
In contrast, different results are obtained under forward looking Taylor 
rules. F om simulations I obtain the following results: 
Note that this stability condition Is weaker than E-stability. 
'Tito result states that learnablility of sunspot equilibria around an Indeterminate 
steady state Is excluded If DO has at least one eigenvalue that has real part greater than 
one, as Is verified In this model for all the plausible parameter values. 
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1) under perfect foresight, there are parameter values for which the sta- 
bility of the active steady state changes in both models with money in the 
utility function and money in the production function; 
2) under learning, there are parameter values for which the stability 
of the active steady state under learning changes as a changes. In both 
cases the system is likely to undergo a Ilopf bifurcationb4, thus generating 
instability even in the case of a locally determinate or learnable inflation 
target; 
3) liquidity traps are non learnable for the model with 0>0. But in 
the case that prices are fixed for a finite timers, the model can be approx- 
imated (asymptotically) by the solution of (3.3) with 0Q0, and liquidity 
traps become learnable under both elastic labor supply and monopolistic 
competition. 
Summing up, under more general assumptions about the market struc- 
ture and market frictions the results discussed in the previous section seem 
to hold, for plausible parameter values. Taking into account more sours ss 
of uncertainty about the `correct' model of the economy does not seem to 
change the predictions of the simple version of the model. 
2.6 Conclusions 
The paper shows that forecast-based Zhylor rules can lend to economic Ist a- 
bility, even in the case of local lcarnbility of the inflation target equilibrium 
and after excluding equilibria that are not learnable. I study a eery sim- 
ple model with flexible prices, under different assumptions about the role 
of money. I find that, whether money enters in the utility function or the 
production function, forecast-based nylor rules are destabilising in the fol- 
lowing sense. Even if the inflation target (or active) steady state is locally 
determinate and stable under learning, there exist other `global' equilibria 
that are also stable under learning. In particular, the economy can be driven 
into a liquidity trap, under both model specifications. Also, the economy 
can converge to learnable cycles and sunspots that can be either close to the 
inflation target or to the liquidity trap equilibrium, depending on the role of 
"In this case, for nearby parameters we have that the active steady statt to surrounded 
by an attracting closed curve. In different models, Crandmont et al. (1028) and 111o6o 
(2001) show the possibility of constructing sunspots that might be learnable. DeVUder 
(1995) shows, under the assumption of perfect foresight, that a Itopf bifurcation might 
lead to higher period cycles that also might be learnable. 
ssu+e Carltrom and Fliest (2000). 
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money. These results show that the multiplicity of equilibria generated by 
the forecast-based Taylor rule seem to be robust, at least to expectational 
mistakes. On the other hand, more backward-looking policy rules stabilize 
the economy in the following sense. The equilibria that exist under forecast- 
based Taylor rules either cease to exist or are not robust to expectational 
mistakes. In fact, backward-looking Taylor rules lead to a unique learnable 
equilibrium: the inflation target. Deterministic cycles, sunspot equilibria 
or the liquidity trap cease to exist or are not stable under learning. The 
results are derived under two particularly unappealing assumptions. First, 
the model is derived under the assumption that the agents observe cur- 
rent economic variables, but under learning dynamics the agents form their 
expectations using t-1 information. Future research should address this 
inconsistency, indeed very common in the literature on bounded rationality. 
Second, in the paper I assume that the central bank has perfect foresight 
while the private sector is boundedly rational. Future research should elim- 
inate this asymmetry and assess the consequences on the results of this 
paper. 
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2.7 Appendix A: Model Solution 
Solving (2.1), with respect to MM p, ct, Mt and B gives the following first 
order conditions, 
QtU+nnr (4, mt") =A (At - Ae+t) (2.43) 
ßtUc (ct, Tr P) =pt, \, (2.44) 
)tf+w (mi) = As - At+i (2.45) 
At = \t+lnt (2.46) 
where At denotes the Lagrange multiplier. By combining (2.44) with 
(2.46) we get equation (2.3). Using (2.43) and (2.43) 1 get: 
Im' (mi) = 
U.., -, (cc, mi p) 
Uc (ct, mt"p) 
Finally, using (2.46) and (2.43) 1 get 
1 ßtUm%p (cep mr') = At 
(i 
-R. (2.47) 
Substituting (2.44) gives (2.4) and (2.5). 
2.8 Appendix B: Proofs 
The proofs refer to results in the book by Evans and I1onkapoja mentioned 
in Ch. 1. The results are also described by Propositions 10 and 11 in Ch. 1. 
Proof of Proposition (12) 
(i) I just re-state the results in Benhabib et al. (2001a, 2001b). Notice 
that the fixed points of F and (2.12) are exactly the same. 
(ii) In order to verify the local stability of the system (2.12), under the 
backward map implied by (2.17), these conditions on the Jacobian need to 
be verified: 
ID) =1 (1- a)21 <1 (2.48) 
58 CHAPTER 2. 
(T) = 
I()22_2+2I < 11+D1 (2.49) 
where it denotes the fixed point. It is straightforward to show that (2.48), 
(2.49) imply the following necessary and sufficient condition for the learn- 
ability of the steady state: 
IG'(7r) I <>. 
«'o do not nocxl to know explicitly on which branch of G the fixed point is. 
In fact, I use the fact that around the fixed point: 
cý(ir) _ T,, (, ). 
hence, determinacy implies learnability and indeterminacy implies non- 
learnability. Given that the condition in the Proposition implies determinacy 
of both steady states (ns it is easy to see from (2.19)), (ii) is proved. 
Proof of Proposition (14) 
(i)-(iii) the proof follows the same steps as in Proposition (12) and it is 
therefore omittcxl. 
(iv) this follows directly from Evans and IIonkapohja (2001b): if C' (jr) < 
-1 then there exist GStable (and therefore learnable under (2.13) and (2.14) 
) stationary sunspot ciuilibria around the fixed point. This condition is 
verified exactly for -(, ý - 
1) < cG,, ,< -(ý' or -1)/2 . 
Proof of Proposition (15) 
(i) first, notice again that although we cannot provide an analytical 
exprmion for Gj we can use 1) the fact that locally the map is conjugate 
to a linear map, and; 2) its relation with the forward looking map F. 
The conditions for stability of the cycle under learning are: 
SDI = 
((1 
- a)2l <1 (2.50) 
IT(a)I = Iv (a) a2 - 2a +2) < I1 +DI (2.51) 
whcro: 
1 
v(ý) %M (7r!! (a)) P (7rL (o)) 
11 ll 1 
na 
fi+ 
-cr 
(epc7) 
- i)] 
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and where -a, c., and fgare the elasticities computed at the two %%lur of it 
over the cycle. From (2.50), (2.51) it is straightforward to obtain a nnaw-ary 
and a sufficient condition for local stability of deterministic cycle t of period 
2 Lo. The sufficient condition for stability under learning, for every viduo of 
a is: 
dc's (ý» (a)) G (inL (o))) 
_ (z'(a)I <1 
which implies I1/v(o)I _IP (in , (a)) F' (irt (v))) > 1. I cliockal numerically 
the existence of ö such that for a<ö the condition is verified. 
From (2.50), (2.51), the necessary (but not sufficient) condition for sta- 
bility is: 
v(a)', < 0. 
I then chock numerically the existence of ö such that for aC (ä, ö) the 
necessary condition is satisfied. Now It is clear from (2.50), (2.51) that 
in this case there exists an äo of low enough value such that the stability 
conditions are verified. Finally, I verify numerically that for or C [5, V) we 
have v(o) > 1. Hence, for a>ö wo have instability tinder learning, for 
every parameter of a and this completes the proof of (I). 
(ii) first using Proposition 12.5 of Evans and Ilonknpolija (2001 a) the ex- 
istence of sunspots E-close to the deterministic cycle is guarnnteotl, providmi 
G2(r1, (a))C1(nL (a)) 0 1. Since %%v know that this condition is violated 
only in the case where the cycle 6 destroyed (a = ä), then it is possible to 
construct stationary sunspots on the deterministic cycle for all a<V. 
Second, by using Proposition 12.7 and 12.9 in Evans and lionknpolija 
(2001a) we have that necessary and sufficient condition for learnability of 
sunspots with the algorithm (2.11) is that: 
G (lr,, (a)) 1(lrL 
(a)) < 1. 
But wo know from (i) that this condition holds for evvry c< v`. I' vom 
Proposition 12.2 of Evans and Ilonknpot. ja (200Ift)br, strong UstnbUity Is 
obtained for IC'z(zr, l (o))C'1(rrL (o ))I < 1. This is verified if a<8. 
"The result is obtained by Cuesnerie and Woodford (1991), p. 118 furs similar 1aºrning 
algorithm. 
svpg. 303. 
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Figure 2.9: 
(iii) If we consider explicitly the map in its backward dynamics, it is ac- 
tually possible to show that sunspot equilibria exist outside a neighborhood 
of the deterministic cycle, both in the cases where the cycle is learnable and 
not. The result depends on the existence of the two branches GI and Gz. 
These sunspots can be constructed by using the global methods of Grand- 
mont (1987): a sunspot equilibrium exists if and only if irl (a) and iz (a) 
are included in the open interval formed by their images: 
Gi (7r2 (a)) < lri (a) < 72 (a) < G2 (in (a)) (2.52) 
Figure 2.9 gives an example: as a=2.35 > ö, the cycle is indeterminate 
in forward dynamics, and non-learnable. By continuity of the eigenvalues, 
also sunspots in the neighborhood of the cycle are not learnable. But it is 
possible to construct sunspots relatively close to the cycle by choosing the 
appropriate branch of G. 
The Figure shows how to construct such a cycle: it is easy to verify that 
condition (2.52) is satisfied5ö. 
"The existence of such suspots for every a depends on the existence of the two branches 
and it can be shown numerically. 
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Following Evans and Iionakpohja (2001), the E-stability conditions are 
given by: 
IT (a) I =I (Zl I+ z22 - 1)G(iri (o))G (ir2 (a))) <1 (2.53) 
I -ziiG (7ri (a)) - z22C (ir2 (a)) I< I1 +D (a)) (2.54) 
For o<v the conditions are satisfied because IG"1(ri (a))G2(a2 (a)) I<1: 
it is sufficient to choose the states inflation values close to the cycle. 
Let us consider the case a>ö. First notice that it is possible to show 
numerically that -1 < Gz(ay (a)) 2-- *2 o<0 
because G2(7r2 (a)) > 
i', for every a. Fix 7r2 (a) such that 72 (a) < 7rL (i. e. the low inflation rate 
at the equilibrium cycle). 
Second, fix 7rl (a) such that Gi(xl (a)) > 0. This value exists for every 
admissible a: in fact, as 7r1 (a) -+ 37, Ci(7r1(a)) = turns positive 
and decreases in absolute value, given that F" (w) >1 for every a. Moreover, 
I checked numerically" (and it is clear from the picture, for a given o) that 
0<C (7r') < 1, for every a. Hence, it is possible to choose a1 (a) E 
(ir', xfj(a)) such that 0< (71(7r') < 1. But this implies that both (2.53) 
and (2.54) are satisfied and the sunspot is learnable. 
Proof of Proposition (5): 
(i) The linearization gives the following difcrcnco equation: 
1-d e +d 
7rt+l = 
-REV -1i 
f` 7t. 
C-OEy 
1- 7ý) 
Given that at the active ss ep > 1, local uniqueness is clearly guaranteed 
by (2.29). Learnability follows as in Proposition (12). On the other hand, 
for cp <1 the result is reversed. 
(ii) The only bifurcation exists at job _- -i 
(1 + it is straight. 
forward to check that the system undergoes a flip bifurcation (it exists a a' 
such that G,. (7r') = -1). It is possible to show numerically, by using re- 
sults from Devaney (1989) that the bifurcation is sub-critical: this means 
that as the active steady state is determinate (and thus (2.29) holds), no 
cycle around it exists. 
6°I checked numerically that for c>1.001 and o 2.5 (?:; Y, given that the cycle does 
not exists for that values of c) the derivative has values ranging from 0.15 to 0.8$. 
62 CHAPTER 2. 
Lemma At each pE (psn, µLR) there exists o(µ) 
auch that a period-doubling bifurcation occurs. For o< a(p) the active 
steady state is determinate and for o> o(µ) it is indeterminate. (2) For 
a> a(p) and sufficiently close to the bifurcation point a period two cycle 
exists. For any a< o(p) no cycle exists. 
Proof of Lemma. From Devaney (1989) the condition for a period 
doubling bifurcation is: 
+3 
1 (dam) #0at (7r*, a(z))" c= 2 
(tg2)2 
Moreover, given 
d=O 
F°(") 
at , r' 
we have that if d. >0 then the bifurcation is sub-critical (the cycle exists 
when the fixed point is stable). It is trivial to verify from the linearized 
equation that d<0. It is also possible to show numericallyß0 that e<0 
for it E (IL ,' 
LR). Moreover, from the linearized equation we have that at 
o= o(; i) F1 is equal to -1. Hence (1) and (2) follow. This proves that no 
cycles exist around the active steady state. 
iii) The linearized equation implies that under condition (2.29), we have: 
C? (3v) > 
where C represent the backward map under the contemporaneous rule. This 
iss the condition for the non-Iearnability of sunspots equilibria, as in Propo- 
sitions 12.6 and 12.10 In Evans and IIonkapohja (2001a). 
(iv) trivial from (2.29). This completes the proof. 
Proof of Profiposition (7): 
(i) After linearization, the local behavior of the system is determined by 
the linear difference equation: 
- )e +a f f " 
Re (2.56) 
femfm - IT --i 
"The Maple program Is available on request. 
2.8. APPENDIX B: PROOFS 63 
which gives determinacy (and learnability) under active monetary policy, 
for any parameter values. By converse, passive policy imply indeterminacy 
(and non-learnability). 
(ii) follows the same steps as (ii) in Proposition (22). 
(iii) it is apparent that is always positive. Hence, at 
comcrn- 
the passive steady state >1 and Proposition 12.6 and 
x- 
12.10 in Evans and Ilonkapohja (2001a) allow to exclude learnability of the 
sunspots equilibria. 
Proof of Proposition (28) 
(i)-(v) In the case of backward-looking, the linearization lcad to: 
cri = I1-t- 
E cmff, Cp(l 6ýlý aj 
at+ý" 
LP 
In the case of forward looking: 
EcmE// +1 
i? t+Z = (EcmEIf + 1) 
7rttl. 
The proof follows following the same steps as for Proposition (15), Protxo- 
sition (19) and Proposition (22). Concerning (iv): it is possible to show 
numerically, as I do for the Lemma, that the change of stability of the in- 
flation target leads to a subcritical bifurcation for it e (11t't, 1 SA). Figure 
7 shows the bifurcation cycle for a given value of it. 
(vi) It is easy to verify that (iv) and (v) hold if. 
IE Err) > 
(ý 
2E,, fv (1 6) 
Then, by letting 8 --º 1 the statement is proved. 
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Chapter 3 
Does Central Bank Transparency Matter 
for Economic Stability? 
3.1 Introduction 
Monetary policy design is a difficult task, given the lack of consensus about 
a `correct' model of the economy. Two main sources of model uncertainty 
are the monetary transmission mechanism and the market expectations' 
formation process. Recent monetary theoryl has proposed the adoption of 
simple instrument rules, dictating that the interest rate should respond to 
deviations of inflation and output gap from their targets. Simple rules are 
claimed to be `robust' to uncertainty about the true model. 
On one hand, many studies have attempted to design an optimal simple 
rule that is robust to different hypothesis about the impact of monetary 
policy on the economy2. On the other hand, a growing literature on bounded 
rationality has focused on the robustness of simple policy rules to small 
expectations mistakes3 on the part of central banks and the private sector. 
'For example, see Woodford (2003). 
2Among the others, Hansen and Sargent (2000) or Onatski and Stock (2000). 
3See for example Bullard and Mitra (2002), Evans and Honkapohja (2002), Howitt 
(1992) and Preston (2002), Sargent and Williams (2002), Sargent (1999). 
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A given policy rule is robust to expectational mistakes if it gives a sat- 
isfactory performance also when expectations are out of the (rational ex- 
pectations) equilibrium, as a result of a change in policy or a structural 
change in the economy. The criterion used to evaluate the performance of 
a rule is whether it induces stability under learning. Thus we are interested 
in whether economic agents who correct their expectations over time, as 
new data are available, will converge to the rational expectation equilibrium 
(REE). 
This paper explores the effects of central bank transparency on the per- 
formance of simple policy rules. I consider the hypothesis that the way a 
given policy rule is implemented might affect its robustness to expectational 
mistakes. In particular, central banks' transparency might affect economic 
stability: if market participants have access to some information about cen- 
tral bank actions, this can improve their predictions and stabilize the eco- 
nomic system. Some degree of transparency and credibility might improve 
the private sector's learning process, affecting the stability under learning. 
Nevertheless, knowing the central bank policy actions does not mean 
that market participants fully understand the `true' model of the economy, 
especially in the case of decentralized markets, where agents ignore each 
others' tastes, production possibilities and expectations. That implies that 
even a well understood policy rule might lead to economic instability, where 
the agents forecasting process does not converge to the REE. 
Following Faust and Svensson (2000), I define transparency as the de- 
gree to which the central bank's intentions can be inferred by market par- 
ticipants. For example, a transparent central bank should provide monetary 
policy reports that explain and motivate its policy choices and should pub- 
lish inflation and output forecasts, used for policy decisions. 
In the context of simple policy rules, I model transparency as the public's 
knowledge about the policy rule. In particular, knowledge about the form 
of the policy rule and about the main variables to which the central bank 
is responding when the interest rate is set. Still, I allow for the possibility 
that the central bank might not be fully transparent. This is captured by 
imperfect knowledge about the coefficients of the policy rule, i. e. how the 
interest rate reacts to the economic variables. A discretionary element of 
policy (modelled as white noise) makes more difficult for the public to infer 
the policy coefficients. 
Current contribution to policy design in a bounded rationality framework 
assume that economic agents learn by recursive updating of an unrestricted 
VAR. This approach is not suitable for the analysis of transparency because 
it does not allow the agents to use prior information about the monetary 
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policy rule. In the paper, learning with unrestricted VAR corresponds to 
the case of no transparency or secrecy on the part of the central bank. The 
agents have no information about the central bank decision process. 
I propose a framework where market participants have a model of the 
economy that includes the monetary policy rule and its effects on output 
and inflation. The agents estimate recursively their model using recursive 
instrumental variable estimators. In order to study the conditions for sta- 
bility under learning in this framework, I apply the results from stochastic 
approximation theory, elaborated by Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans 
and Honkapohja (2001), to study the convergence properties of recursive 
simultaneous equation estimation. 
In this paper monetary policy is conducted by setting the interest rate 
according to a Taylor rule. The economy is described by a simple forward 
looking microfunded model with nominal rigidities, on the lines of Wood- 
ford (2003) and Benhabib et al. (2001). Given the uncertainty about the 
impact of monetary policy on the economy, I consider different hypotheses. 
I first analyze a version of the model where monetary policy has immediate 
effects on output and inflation. This is the most common assumption in 
the literature, but empirical evidence shows that monetary policy has little 
immediate effect on real activity and inflation. For this reason, following 
Woodford (2002) I consider a more general version of the model where there 
are delays in the effects of monetary policy. I assume that expenditures and 
pricing decisions are made in advance, and thus depend on old information 
about the economic conditions. 
I show that in the case of a monetary policy rule that reacts to cur- 
rent inflation and output gap or in the case that expectations about current 
and future interest rates do not affect output gap and inflation, stability 
under learning is not affected by transparency. This seems to imply that 
some rules are destabilizing per se, independently of the way they are im- 
plemented. In other words, instability occurs even if every agent in the 
economy understands how monetary policy is conducted. In this case, even 
expected and fully credible changes in the policy rule lead the economy to 
instability induced by self-fulfilling expectations. I also show that the cost 
channel of monetary policy modifies the stability properties of Taylor rule. 
For a Taylor rule to induce a learnable equilibrium, the interest rate should 
react to some degree to the output gap, even in the case of perfect trans- 
parency of the central bank. This implies that the Taylor Principle, stating 
that a Taylor rule is stabilizing if it reacts aggressively to deviations of the 
inflation rate from target, is not a sufficient condition to guarantee stability. 
It also implies that determinacy of the minimum state variable solution of a 
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model under rational expectations is not enough to guarantee the stability 
of the equilibrium under learning, in contrast with the findings of McCal- 
lum (2002). A similar result is found in Preston (2003), in a different model 
environment. 
Conversely, under plausible assumptions about the monetary transmis- 
sion mechanism, I show that lack of transparency can induce instability even 
if desirable policies are adopted. 
In the second part of the paper I attempt an evaluation of the effects 
of central bank transparency on the volatility and persistence of inflation 
output and the interest rate. I also propose an estimation approach for 
the monetary model with learning. The implementation is left for further 
research. 
The results of the paper might suggest an alternative explanation for 
the observed response of the economy to a monetary policy shock observed 
in the US data. The response is more dramatic in the 70's and it is ex- 
tremely reduced in the 90's. This might be due to changes in the public's 
understanding of monetary policy, rather than changes in the policy rule. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section introduces the model 
and discusses its stability under Rational Expectations. The second and 
third sections describe the model and its solution. In sections 4-6 I discuss 
the stability result under different hypothesis about the model environment. 
Finally, in section 7I describe some simulation results and the plans for 
future research. 
3.2 A Simple Model 
I consider a simple model of the economy, on the lines of Woodford (2003) 
and Benhabib et al. (2001). The model is fully forward-looking, explicitly 
microfunded and displays sticky prices. In order to keep the analysis sim- 
ple I abstract from capital accumulation. The economy is populated by a 
continuum of identical consumers/producers. 
Each agent j produces a differentiated good (Y1) in a monopolistically 
competitive market. Assuming a fixed capital stock, labor and money ser- 
vices are the production inputs. Therefore, output is produced according 
to 
yj =f hi 
pt 3.1 
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where Mt denotes nominal money balances and Pt is an index of the price 
level. In the paper I also consider the case where money gives direct utility to 
the consumer, because it facilitates transactions. The production function f 
satisfies the standard conditions. Each agent consumes a composite good CC , 
obtained by some aggregation of each single differentiated goods produced. 
The aggregate demand for each good depends on the aggregate income and 
the relative price of the good 
Y' = Dt p Yt (3.2) 
t 
where Yt is aggregate output, p/ is the price of good j and the function 
Dt is assumed to be decreasing in the price and satisfies the following two 
conditions: Dt (1) =1 and Ot = Dt/Dt < -1 for every t. The parameter O t, 
measuring the elasticity of demand is assumed to vary over time according to 
an exogenous process. This implies time-varying mark-ups for the producers 
and introduces a source for supply shocks in the economy. 
The economy is represented by a continuum of consumers-producers that 
seek to maximize the value of the sum of future expected utilities of the form 
2 i 
( Et L, 
{ß8tU 
C, i 
p° 
-V (h; ) +2 
ý° 
- II* (3.3) 
B-e 8 
P)-1 
Co ( 
where Mt denotes nominal money balances held by agent j and II' is the 
steady state gross inflation rate. Also, U (., .) 
is the utility function from 
consumption and money balances and V (. ) denotes the disutility from la- 
bor. Moreover, U (.,. ) is assumed to be increasing, twice differentiable and 
strictly concave and V (. ) is increasing, twice differentiable and strictly con- 
vex. In particular, I consider the case in which U (., .) 
is non-separable in 
consumption and real money balances4. This might be considered the most 
empirically relevant case, given that the marginal benefit of additional real 
balances increases as consumption (i. e. total transactions) increases5. 
The last term in (3.3) denotes the cost of changing the current price. 
Assuming yt = ry (1 + Bt) <0 for every t implies price stickiness (but not 
sticky inflation). The choice of convex adjustment costs follows Rotemberg 
4The case where the utility function is separable is the most analyzed in the literature 
about policy rule. 
5For details, see Woodford (2002). 
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(1982) and it is dictated by the necessity to keep the non-linear model as 
simple as possible. The linearized solution of the model takes the same 
form that would be obtained if a Calvo pricing scheme is used (even if the 
parameters have a different interpretation). Notice that the adjustment cost 
term has a plausible behavioral interpretation in an economic environment 
where gross inflation is close to II*, which is the case I consider in the paper. 
The expectation operator Ei-1 denotes the subjective beliefs of agent j 
about the probability distribution of the model's state variables. Given the 
assumption that the agents do not know the true model of the economy, the 
11 " denotes non-rational expectations. Notice that agents take decisions for 
time t consumption and production, on the basis of t-1 information. This 
can be interpreted in two ways: either the agents plan their consumption, 
production and asset holding in advance or they act on the basis of old 
information. 
I assume that financial markets are incomplete, and the only non-monetary 
asset that is possible to trade is a one period riskless bond. The agents' flow 
budget constraint is 
M +13t < (1+it`_1)Mt 1+(1+it-1)D l+Pt f 
(hi, M1) -Ti-PC 
(3.4) 
where B denotes the riskless bond, it denotes the interest paid on money 
balances and it denotes the interest paid on the bond. Also Tt denotes 
lump-sum taxers from the government. 
3.2.1 Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
I assume that the government is committed to a zero debt fiscal policy. As 
a consequence, taxes evolve as follows 
Tt = (1 + it'-, ) Mt-I + PtGt - Mt 
where Gt defines government expenditures. I further assume that Gt is an 
exogenous AIt(1) process. 
Monetary policy is conducted according to a simple interest rate rule. I 
consider two possible ways of implementing the interest rule. 
1. Quantity adjustments. The Central Bank decides the target interest 
rate and then implement it trough quantity adjustment in the money 
supply. In this case, it is fixed to zero. 
3.3. MODEL SOLUTION 75 
2. Adjustments of the interest paid on the monetary base. In this case I 
assume that the central bank changes it as the target interest rate is 
modified, in order to keep a constant spread: i. e. 4= it. 
The policy rule determines the interest rate as a function of the current 
state of the economy, or estimates of it. In the course of the paper I consider 
different rules that are commonly considered in the literature. In order to 
keep the analysis simple, this paper does not consider inertial rulesa. This 
case would require a separate study. In its general form the policy rule can 
be expressed as 
it = i+ ¢EE i(irt - a") + c5ZE (St - x') + Et (3.5) 
where xt denotes the output gap, as defined below. In order to keep the 
analysis simple, I do not explicitly consider what decision process leads to 
a specific choice of the policy coefficients7. Forecasts by the central bank, 
E, might be different from the private sector's. Notice that I consider 
the hypothesis that the bank's rule is `operational' in the sense of McCal- 
lum (1999). Also, et can be seen as a control error or some discretionary 
component, modelled as white noise. 
3.3 Model Solution 
The solution of the model gives a sequence of consumption, labor, and money 
balances that maximizes (3.3) subject to (3.4) and a market clearing condi- 
tion. In equilibrium, agents will take identical production, consumption and 
saving decisions. I further assume that they have the same beliefs about 
the economy (even though they might not be aware of that). Appendix A 
describes the model solution in both cases where money enters in the utility 
function or in the production function. Assuming that consumption, money 
and pricing decisions are predetermined t-1 periods in advance, the log- 
linearized model is described by the following equations. The demand side 
of the economy is 
xe = Ei i ['line - 724n - lrt+i - 772 (it+i - CO -- 11+ Ei 
ixt+t (3.6) 
"See Woodford (2002). 
'For example, the optimal non-inertial rules, under both commitment and discretion, 
in Ciannoni and Woodford (2002). 
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where &, Y11 and 772 = 77l -1 depend on the coefficients of the demand for 
money and the utility function. EP i denotes the expectation operator for 
the private sector. Also, xti =Y- 
Yte, is the output gap, defined as output 
deviations from the efficient level of output, obtained in the case of fully 
flexible prices and in the absence of mark-up shocks. Finally, f is the 
natural rate of interest, assumed to be evolving as an AR(1) process. 
If monetary frictions are modeled by having money in the utility function, 
real money balances affect intertemporal consumption decisions. As shown 
in (3.6), expected high interest rates on nonmonetary assets, and therefore 
expected low money balances, stimulate consumption today relatively to 
next period's. Notice that this holds only in the case where the interest 
differential between monetary and nonmonetary assets is allowed to vary. 
This is the case where the policy rule is implemented through adjustment in 
the supply of money (in this case a"tn = 0). If the central bank keeps a fixed 
spread between monetary and nonmonetary asset, then the IS equation is 
equivalent to (3.6) with 'h =1 and 172 = 0. Only the expected current 
interest rate on nonmonetary assets affects the evolution of the output gap. 
In the case of money in the production the IS equation is equivalent to 
(3.6) with r7l =1 and 772 = 0, independently of how monetary policy is 
implemented. 
Independently of how money enters in the model, the key parameter that 
describes the demand effects of monetary policy is ö: it is proportional to 
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumption. As shown 
in the Appendix, the value of ö is higher in the case of monetary frictions, 
thus magnifying the effects of interest rate changes on the output gap. 
The supply side of the economy is described by the following Phillips 
curve 
7re = EpiR7ra+i + kEi i [it +'73 (It -I )] + Ut (3.7) 
where is measures the inflation response to the output gap and 113 measures 
the supply-side effects of monetary policy. An increase in interest rates dif- 
ferentials increases the opportunity cost of holding money and thus increases 
the marginal cost of production. Equation (3.7) with £" =0 has the same 
functional form of the supply curve obtained from a simple model including 
the cost channel of monetary policy8. The parameter that captures the size 
of the cost channel is 173: it is different from zero in both cases of money in 
the production function and money in the utility function9. 
'See for example Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Ravenna and Walsh (2003). 
gAssuming money as a productive asset is a simple and coherent way to evaluate the 
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The equation includes a cost-push shock ut, that depends on shocks to 
the mark-up of firms. The shock is assumed to be generated by an AR(1) 
process. 
The model of the economy is given by equations (3.6), (3.7), and the 
policy rule (3.5). It can be written in matrix term as follows 
V= Ao +A P 1 SEP! VV +A i BEB BV +A z SEE 
i Vt+i + A3Xt (3.8) 
Xt = HXt-1 + Ce 
0 Pu 
H=LPr OJ 
where Vi =( Xt 7rt it ) 1, Xt = (r"i ut )'and <i is a vector of i. i. d. 
shocks. In order to close the model I need to specify how expectations are 
formed. 
3.3.1 The Expectation Formation Mechanism: Methodology 
In this paper I follow the "Euler Approach" to econometric learning, as de- 
fined in Evans, Honkapohja and Mitra (2002) and widely used and discussed 
in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Marcet and Sargent (1989). It predicts 
that agents' behavior is based on equations (3.6) and (3.7), derived from the 
Euler equations, under the assumption of possibly non fully rational expeo- 
tationsl0. The agents are modelled as econometricians. They are endowed 
with beliefs about the law of motion of the main economic variables. Their 
Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) includes all the relevant variables and is 
asymptotically correctly specified. As a result, the agents will eventually 
learn to make rational predictions, if the learning process converges to the 
Rational Expectations Equilibrium. 
As noted in Preston (2002), the Euler equations are not the optimal 
decision rules given the assumed beliefs and microfundations. In fact, 
the agents should take into account not only the flow budget constraint 
but also their intertemporal budget constraint. This results on decision 
rules that depend on infinite horizon forecasts. My choice is based on the 
cost channel of monetary policy, given the evidence that the highest fraction of money 
demand comes from firms. 
'°A recent contribution by Preston (2002) proposes a different approach where the 
agents decision rules depend on long horizon forecasts. It would be possible to extend my 
analysis in that framework. This is left for future research. 
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analytical simplicity of the Euler approach. Nevertheless, the decision rules 
of the agents converge asymptotically to the optimal decision rule, under the 
assumption that their initial wealth is zero. 
I assume that market participants are atomistic and they are not coor- 
dinated on some shared belief on the model of the economy. Also, I assume 
that they cannot observe aggregate expectations about the macroeconomic 
variables. As a consequence, their model of the economy cannot be the true 
aggregate model represented by (3.6) and (3.7). Their Perceived Law of 
Motion (PLM) of the economy might include contemporaneous variables, 
like the output gap and the interest rate, but does not include aggregate 
expectations. 
This implies that, even if the model is asymptotically correct; a) during 
the learning process the agents' model is misspecified; b) its coefficients will 
not be policy invariant. Adopting a new policy will require the agents to 
adjust their model, irrespective to their knowledge of how monetary policy 
is conducted. No matter how precise it is the knowledge about the policy 
rule, the agents are still uncertain about the economic environment and 
thus they cannot properly calculate the effects of the monetary policy on 
the main economic variables such as output, inflation and the interest rate1l. 
Still, once the learning process has converged the model delivers the same 
forecasts as the true model. 
In conclusion, knowledge of the policy rule does not eliminate the prob- 
lem of stability under learning. It is then possible to evaluate whether 
transparency has effects on the stability under learning of a given policy 
rule. 
3.4 The Model With Current Information 
I consider first the version of the model which is mostly used for policy 
analyses, including stability under learning. Under the assumption of no 
delays, the model can be expressed in matrix notation as 
Vi = Ai + Ä2E SVt+I + Ä3X (3.9) 
for suitable matrices. 
"This is because the information available to the agents is not enough to recover all 
the policy-invariant parameters that define the economy. In other words, the model that 
they estimate is still subject to the Lucas critique, since the parameters change with the 
monetary policy rule. 
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3.4.1 VAR Learning: The Case of No Transparency 
As I mentioned in the section above, in the case of no transparency, the 
public is not given enough reliable information to use the policy rule to 
predict interest rate movements and their impact on output gap and infla- 
tion. In this case, I model the agents' prediction process following Evans 
and Honkapohja (2001) and Marcet and Sargent (1989). I assume that each 
agent has the same PLM 
Vt = Co, t-i + flit-lXt + et (3.10) 
where output gap, inflation and the interest rate depend on exogenous 
shocks. Also, et denotes a vector of perceived i. i. d. shocks. The PLAT 
is linear and include all the variables that are included in the MSV solution 
of the model. Thus the model is consistent with the REE. Nevertheless, it is 
misspecified during the learning process. The agents estimate recursively the 
coefficients of their linear model using recursive least squares (RLS). They 
assume the model to have fixed coefficients. The coefficients are updated 
according to the following algorithm 
Slt = ct-i + ötl 11Xt (Vt - Xtllt_i + ot)' (3.11) 
Rt=Rt-1+St(XtXX-1Zt-1) 
where Sgt =( 11o, t 0i, t )', Rt is the precision matrix and dt is a decreasing 
sequence of gains, satisfying certain properties12. The updating equation 
includes an observational i. i. d. error, ot that makes the learning process non 
trivial. As it is well known from Evans and Iionakapohja (2001), stability 
of the REE under learning obtains if the E-Stability conditions are met. 
Inserting (3.10) into (3.9) gives the Actual Law of Motion (ALM) of the 
economic system 
Vt = 2' (SZo, t-i, fui, t-i) IVt 
where Wt =(1 Xt )'. The E-Stability condition requires that the 
mapping between PLM and ALM to be locally stable at the REE, where 
T (W) = V. It is apparent why during the learning process the agents' 
model is misspecified. The ALM implies a model with time-varyng coeffi- 
cients. The PLM is a correctly specified model of the economy only asymp- 
totically, if the learning process converges to the BEE. 
The following proposition defines the conditions for learnability under 
reduced-form learning. In order to obtain clear analytical results I impose 
12 See Evans and Honkapohja (2001). 
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assumptions on some of the parameters, that are not contradicted by stan- 
dard calibrations, as showed in Table I. 
Table I 
Proposition 33 Assume that 'Q < 1. Assume that the private sector's 
learning process is described by (3.10) and (3.11). 
(i) Then the TREE is stable under learning if-and only if 
r, (Oir -1)+0x(1-Q)-173rIo: >0 (3.12) 
Proof. see Appendix B.   
The proposition shows a `qualified' version of the results obtained by 
Iiowitt (1992) and Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Preston (2002), for the 
case of monetary frictions. If the policy rule is too passive or it prescribes 
an excessive reaction to the output gap, then the REE is unstable under 
learning. If the REE is unstable under learning, there will be self-fulfilling 
expectations leading to potentially explosive behavior of output and infla- 
tion. 
In the analysis above I have assumed that the agents do not have infor- 
mation concerning the monetary policy rule. With knowledge about future 
policy actions the agents can improve their forecasts and this might affect 
the stability properties of a given policy rule. This amounts to asking the 
following question: is a policy rule violating (3.12) inherently destabilizing 
or is it the way the policy is implemented that affects its performance? 
3.4.2 A Transparent Central Banker 
When agents have information about how monetary policy is conducted 
and they are willing to use it to improve their forecasts. Consider the most 
plausible case where market participants know the form of the policy rule 
but not the exact value of the parameters. The policy rule that they estimate 
is 
ie = 010, t_1 +''/,,, c-i7re + , t-Ixt 
+ et (3.13) 
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where the constant captures the long-run objectives of the central bank, i. e. 
the inflation target, and the coefficients describe how aggressive the policy 
is in responding to inflation and output gap deviations from target. The 
initial parameters (? Po, o 0,,, o 0., 0 ) can be interpreted as the initial 
level of credibility of the central bank, depending on how close they are to 
the true parameter values. The agents might use the information about the 
policy rule to improve their forecast of inflation and output. 
In order for this information to be useful for prediction, the agents need 
a model to identify the effects of monetary policy on output and inflation. 
Since, in a decentralized market, agents do not have specific information 
about other market participants' tastes and expectations, their model does 
not include the average opinion and does not correspond to the true model. 
On the other hand, it explicitly includes the effects of monetary policy on 
output and inflation. The agents PLM for output will then be 
St = b-o'l, t_1+ 7, t_, it + 
Fl, 
t-iri + ei (3.14) 
where each agent j can observe the current interest rate and the demand 
shock rr. The equation for output gap takes into account the possible effects 
of monetary policy on the current output gap, and movements in the natural 
rate of interest. The inflation equation can take the form 
7't = lv0-2, t_1 + 7, t_jxt + l, t_lut + et 
(3.15) 
where the agents take into account that monetary policy has its effects on 
the inflation process because it affects the output gap. The equation includes 
also the cost-push shock. Aggregating across different agents, and using the 
fact that expectations are identical, it is possible to write the PLM in a more 
compact notation 
rt-i V= Bo, t-i + Bi, t-iXt + et (3.10) 
which gives a system of simultaneous equations. Notice that the last equation 
of the system, corresponding to the interest rate, depends on the form of 
the policy rule. 
Given that the agents estimate a model with the unique purpose of 
prediction, I should discuss what are the incentives to use information about 
the policy rule. Assuming that the agents do not take the into account the 
effects of their learning process on the aggregate variables, if the model 
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is exactly identified, they should be indifferent between reduced form and 
structural estimation13. 
Nevertheless, the recursive updating of the estimator allows them to use 
prior information about the coefficients of the estimated policy rule, thus 
making structural estimation more suitable. In the case of perfect trans- 
parency and credibility, the agents know the value of the policy coefficients, 
and the PLM (3.16) allows them to use this information for prediction. No- 
tice also that by estimating the policy rule (3.13) they actually estimate an 
equation that is well specified at any point in time, and not only asymptoti- 
cally, as it is the case for the other equations14. 
The agents are assumed to estimate recursively the system (3.16). As it 
is well known, Least squares estimation would lead to inconsistency. Hence, 
I assume that they update the coefficients of their model by using Recursive 
Instrumental Variables (RIV). In order for the model (3.16) to be estimated, 
it needs to be identified, i. e. we need as many instruments as many endoge- 
nous variables. Recall that an exogenous variable of the model can be used 
as an instrument if it is not included in the equation. In (3.14) we have one 
endogenous variable, the interest rate, and one instrument available, the 
cost-push shock ut. In the inflation equation there is also one endogenous 
variable, and the instrument available is the demand shock Tt . Finally, es- 
timation of the Taylor rule (3.13) requires two instruments, since both r 
and 7rt enter the equation. Both the demand and supply shocks can be 
used as instruments, because they do not appear in the equation. Given the 
instruments, the recursive version of the estimator can be showed to be15 
9t = Ot-1 + JtRt 
11Qe (Vt 
- (6_, z)' + Ot) (3.17) 
77e = nt-1 + öt (QtZz - 77t-1) 
where 
Ot =( boi, t b1,, t Yii, t b02, t '121, t b22, t V)o, t 'Plr, t lpx, t 
)' 
Consider the matrices Rt, Qt and Z. The first matrix is 
"For example, Dhrymes (1978). 
In fact, it is well known that during the learning process the agents' model is mis- 
specified because the ALM has time varying coefficients. This does not not hold for the 
estimated Taylor rule. 
In order to simplify the convergence analysis I assume that the gain matrix R appears 
lagged in the updating equation. 
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Rt= (I3®F') 
where Rrh is the matrix gain associated to 
teach 
single equation (with h= 
y, ir, i respectively). Also 
Qt = (I3 0 Wt) 
is the matrix of instruments and Wt =(1 Xt )'. Finally 
Zt 03x1 °3x1 
Zt = 03x1 Zt °3x1 
03x1 03x1 ZZ 
is the matrix of regressors, where 
ZZ =(1 rt , it 
)'; Zt =(1 xt Ut '; Zt' = (1 xt erg )'. 
Using the PLM (3.16), the aggregate expectation is 
EtVt+i = rt 1 Bo, t-1 +r 11B1, t_1IIXt 
where to simplify I assume, without loss of generality, that the agents know 
the matrix H. Inserting the PLM in (3.9), we get the Actual Law of Motion 
V= Al + A2 (r 11B0, t_1 +r 
11B1, 
t-1HXx) + A3Xe + A4Et (3.18) 
that can be re-written 
V=r (et-1) Wt + A4Et. (3.19) 
Given (3.19), the REE equilibrium is defined as the fixed point of the map 
fl. ), which satisfy16 
T (0*) = 0*. 
Inserting (3.19) in (3.17) I obtain the following stochastic dynamical system 
Bt = et-1 +ötRt 
11Qt (I'' (Bt-1) Wt - (9 _iZt)') + 
dtl 1ýQA4Et (3.20) 
and 
Rt=it-i+St(QtZ -Ri-i). 
The following Proposition describes the conditions for stability under learn- 
ing. 
"Notice that the REE can be expressed in the form of (3.16). In fact, tti - I""Bi 
and f1o* = r-' Bo* 
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Proposition 34 Assume that !<1. Assume that the private sector's 
learning process is described by (3.16) and (3.17). 
(i) In the case where Ute, = 0. The REE is stable under learning if and 
only if (3.12) is Satisfied. Monetary policy transparency does not affect local 
stability under learning. 
(ii) In the case with Un>0, (or money enters in the production func- 
tion), under Woodford (2002) and Clarida et al. (1999) calibration, the 
stability condition is not affected by policy transparency. 
(iii) Assume full transparency, i. e. each agents knows the coefficients of 
the policy rule. The stability conditions are unchanged. 
Proof. see Appendix B.   
The Proposition shows that under the current assumptions about the 
model of the economy, being transparent does not help. Notice that if 
Uý,,, = 0, expectations about the future interest rate are not used for pre- 
diction. This does not mean that information about the policy rule is not 
useful to forecast future output and inflation, since those depend on the 
future interest rate. As stated in (ii), transparency does not help even if the 
agents need to predict the future interest rate. This leads to the following 
conclusions. Condition (3.12) does not depend on the way the monetary 
authority implements the policy rule. Even if every agent understands how 
monetary policy is conducted, a policy rule that violates (3.12) would lead to 
economic instability. Instability is determined by the fact that the agents in 
the economy are not coordinated on the REE, and do not fully understand 
the true model of the economy. 
More generally, this result seems to suggest that improved predictabil- 
ity does not necessarily improve stability. Even full knowledge about the 
policy rule does not improve stability under learning. Even if a fully credi- 
ble central bank announces a policy rule that violates (3.12), the outcome 
will be destabilizing. This conclusion suggests that some policy options are 
destabilizing per se, without the possibility for the central bank to improve 
on their performance. 
3.5 The general case with delays 
As mentioned in the introduction, there is evidence from empirical studies 
and central bank practices that the assumptions made in the previous section 
about the monetary transmission mechanism and the policy rule are at odds 
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with the facts. Considering the monetary transmission mechanism, VAR 
evidence from Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Boivin and Giannoni 
(2002) shows that output and inflation respond to a monetary shock with 
lags. Concerning monetary policy rules, Orphanides (2003) shows that the 
Federal Reserve makes active use of forecasts about current and future values 
of inflation and output gap. The next section investigates the implications 
of these assumptions on the effects of central bank transparency. 
3.5.1 The Case of a Non-'I'ransparent Central Bank 
As above, the agents only know the sets of variables that appear in the MSV 
reduced form solution of the model under rational expectations and they 
conjecture a linear relationship between output, inflation, interest rate and 
these variables. The central bank does not disclose information about the 
relevant variables to which reacts, its forecasts or the policy rule coefficients. 
Therefore, the agents forecast current and future interest rates by using an 
unrestricted VAR, which the interest rate to the t-1 observations of the 
exogenous processes. The PLM becomes 
V= göt-i + nit-iXt-i (3.21) 
where h= PS denotes the aggregate PLM of the private sector and h= CD 
denotes the forecast of the central bank. The following proposition describes 
the stability conditions under learning. 
Proposition 35 Assume XI < 1. Given the model (3.8) and the PLM 
(3.21).. 
(i) The REE is locally stable under learning if the following conditions 
are satisfied: 
'(Ox-1)+(1-0)Ox -rctls0x>0 (3.22) 
and 
ök [olr (s+ ä-l -1, + [r. &-(1-ß)](2-ß) 0x > 0s -- /[l + r1773119 
(3.23) 
(ii) there exist learning equilibria, where inflation fluctuates around the 
inflation target, even in the case (3.12) is satisfied and the REE is locally 
determinate and unique. 
Proof. see Appendix C.   
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Figure 3.1: 
Predetermined economic decisions and less information about the state 
of the economy affect the stability conditions under learning. The choice of 
¢x becomes crucial for stability. If the policy rule reacts too much to the 
output gap, (3.22) is violated and instability occurs. But (3.23) states that 
the policy rule should react to some degree to the output gap. 
The stability condition is modified if we consider the model with small 
real balance effects (i. e. 713 small). In this case, (3.22). approximates the 
Taylor principle but (3.23) requires a positive value for q5 , even if 773 = 0. Using the Woodford calibration with 0, = 2, y ^_, 0.05. 
Using the Clarida et 
al. calibration ¢x = 0.9. Figure 3.1 shows the case for this latter calibration. 
Condition (3.22) is represented by the solid line, while condition (3.23) 
is represented-by the dotted line. In the area below the solid line the equi- 
librium is determinate, under rational expectations. The shaded area shows 
the combination of policy parameters for which we obtain stability, if the 
central bank is not transparent. It is immediate to see that determinacy is 
obtained for a wider set of parameters. 
3.5. THE GENERAL CASE WITH DELAYS 87 
Also, from (ii) in the proposition we know that for values of ct that 
is close to the bifurcation value, the learning process induces additional 
fluctuations in inflation, output and interest uzte, even in the case of local 
learnability of the REE. Notice that under rational expectations the unique 
equilibrium is the inflation target. It is the learning behavior that generates 
other equilibria where inflation fluctuates. In the next section I consider 
whether some degree of transparency can avoid these outcomes or if they 
inherently depend on the learning process. 
Summing up, in order to get stability (at least locally) the central bank 
would need to increase its response to the output gap. But we know that 
central banks do not have accurate data about this variable, and that exces- 
sive response to this variable might lead to destabilizing policies17. Hence, 
on one side the central bank has to respond aggressively to the output gap, 
in order to coordinate expectations. On the other side this might not be an 
option, because of the scarce reliability of output gap estimates. In the next 
section, I consider whether improved transparency can promote economic 
stability. 
3.5.2 The Case of a Transparent Central Bank 
In this case, I assume that the agents make use of information about the 
central bank decision making. The central bank is assumed to be more 
transparent about its policy decisions. For example, it is clear about its 
goals and how to achieve them and it publishes its forecasts about the current 
inflation rate and output gap. This means that these forecasts are in the 
agents' information set, at the time they form their expectations. On the 
other side, I allow for the possibility that the bank is not fully transparent, 
i. e. it has an incentive to misrepresent the economic conditions. Hence, I 
consider the possibility that the central bank reports its forecast with an 
i. i. d. error, i. e. Et Girt = Et Birt+e, r, t_1 and 
Ei Bxt = Ei ýxg+e=, i_1. The 
agents are assumed to estimate over time the following policy rule 
it = Vo, t-1 +'+/i. ir, t-dEt' 
irrt + ips, t-l 
ýxt + et (3.24) 
which, assuming a potential i. i. d. observation errors, can be estimated 
consistently using recursive instrumental variables, by regressing ii_l on 
Bd7r=_1 and . dxt_l. At the end of each period the agents update their 
estimate of the Taylor rule according to 
'fit = O't-i +öR; t_1 We-i (it - Oi_1Ze_1) (3.25) 
"See, Orphanides (2001) and Bullard and Eusepi (2003). 
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irt Jý t=[ 0o, t-i ox, t ''/'r, t ]'; Zt-i =[1 Ei Bxt Et B11 
Notice that, in order to form expectations at time t, the agents are assumed 
to use t-1 estimates of the coefficients. I also allow the agents to use a 
less efficient but simpler and more robust learning rule, i. e. the Stochastic 
Gradient Algorithm. The updating equation is defined as follows 
Ot =1t_1 + aavt_i (it - Oi_1z _1) (3.26) 
The model (3.8) can be re-expressed as follows 
Vt = D0 + B1ýii-1ýBVt + B2EPiVt + (3.27) 
+B30t-1EtC21V+1 + B4EPiYt+1 + B5Xt-i + St (3.28) 
it =z+ ¢ýEca(ýrt - ý') + ýzEi 
B (xt - x') + Et 
where fit =[ xt 7rt ] '. Notice that I use the fact that the private sec- 
tor can observe the central bank forecast, i. e. EP P-5 (Et (C _ Band 
Et '191 (Et B) = Et 151 (EE BI (El B)) = Et B1. The latter equality can be jus- 
tified in two ways; a) the central bank publishes forecasts of current and 
future inflation, b) the central bank makes available its forecasting proce- 
dures. In both ways, the bank makes it easier for the public to predict its 
future policy moves. 
Since contemporaneous variables dot not enter in the true model, the 
agents estimate the behavior of output gap and inflation by using unre- 
stricted VAR estimation. Their PLM is therefore 
Vc = ýö, t-1 ý' Oi, t-1Xt-1 et (3.29) 
where, again, h= PS, CB. The coefficients are updated using either RLS 
or SG. The following Proposition describes local stability under learning, 
under RLS and SG learning. To simplify the analysis I assume that the 
central bank and the private sector use the same learning rule. 
Proposition 36 Consider the case U,,,, = 0. 
(i) In the case of Recursive Instrumental Variable or RLS learning, some 
degree of transparency implies REE stability, provided that the Taylor Prin- 
ciple is satisfied: full transparency is NOT needed for stability. The REE is 
locally unique; 
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(ii) In the case of SG learning, perfect transparency implies REE sta- 
bility, provided that the Taylor Principle is satisfied. In the case of partial 
transparency stability is achieved provided the Taylor principle is satisfied 
and the eigenvalues of M ,, 
h*' are positive, where My = El; m i_., 0XXXt. 
Consider the case U,: n >0 (or money in the production function). (iii) Transparency implies that the set of locally learnable Taylor rules 
is larger than in the case of no transparency; Nevertheless, pure inflation 
targeting leads to instability and learning equilibria. A sufficient condition 
for uniqueness and stability under learning, other than q, r > 
1, is 
773 +x 1<Z 011 a 
773 
(3.30) 
As 0 -º1 condition (3.30) becomes also necessary. 
Proof. see Appendix C.   
The result shows that under a more plausible model environment trans- 
parency matters. It is important to remark that full transparency is not 
needed for stability. That is what makes the result appealing, given that 
full transparency (i. e. et is observable by the public and no errors in ex- 
pectations) is not observed in reality and it is not advocated by monetary 
theory, as showed in Faust and Svensson (2002). 
Nevertheless, including expectations in the policy rule and having the 
agents taking decisions based on older information restricts the set of stabi- 
lizing policy rules, as showed in (3.30). The central bank needs to set ¢>0 
to guarantee stability. Even a fully transparent policy violating (3.30) would 
be destabilizing, as long as the agents have imperfect information about the 
economic environment. Lack of transparency has the effect of increasing the 
policy rules that do not induce instability under learning. Condition (3.30) 
is expressed in terms of the two key structural parameters of the model: Q 
and 773. If the demand channel of monetary policy is much stronger than the 
supply channel, stability can be achieved by choosing relatively low values 
of 0x, which might be desirable, given the poor information available about 
the output gap. Estimates of 773 in Ravenna and. Walsh (2003) vary from 
1.3 to around 5, indicating that a too low response to the output gap might 
lead to instability for plausible parameter values. Consider the following 
example. Assume ¢.,, =2,773 = 0.89 (or 2) and the other parameters at 
benchmark values. Then, for ¢x > 0.004 (0.015) the REE is locally stable 
under learning. The Taylor rule prescribes a coefficient much higher than 
this value. Nevertheless, the central bank should choose ¢z much higher 
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Figure 3.2: 
than 0.004, given that for values close to this, the learning behavior gen- 
erates extra volatility in the main variables. Numerical simulations show 
that choosing 0z > 0.13 guarantees a monotone response of the economy to 
economic disturbances. This is very close to the coefficient of the Taylor, 
which is 0., = 0.5/4. 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the response of output and inflation after a 
positive demand shock. In Figure 3.2, which shows the case of 0y = 0.13, 
inflation increases as the output gap increases and it is promptly reduced. 
In Figure 3.3, with 0. = 0.05, the increase in the output gap is followed 
by an initial increase in inflation and an oscillatory adjustment of the two 
variables. Notice that in the latter case the fluctuations in inflation and 
output gap are more pronounced18. Notice that if (3.30) is satisfied the only 
equilibrium under learning is the REE, by the same argument used for the 
previous proposition. 
"The Figures show simulation of the ODE described in the text and in the appendix. 
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Concluding, t, l1c way a policy is iui1)IenuentP(l has c'ffec"tS uu it s st, Lb ilitY 
under learning. A policy rule might t Ix! iIII( l(rr 1wrfuruiing Trot Ii((, cu, (, t lu- 
riilc is iiilicrcutly (1estai iIiriIIg, hut. be c; of Ilie way it is iIIIp14-ile ntt tl. 
Fur (OIIIplet (imess. tlic following )sit inu discusses tIII - Iwiirninný 
of ()th er I)Olicv rules currently ; an: clvie(l in tu t' literature. In particular. a 
policy rule responding Co private sector exl, ectat iOnis tuighit not t lI(- 
lprol, lem r, l' instability, at least for this class of lwlicy rules. 
Propositions 37 Assuvic that private sector's decision.,; air fuken with tI 
1iIfuiic1atinir. u. iacl (j, ", = 0. 
(i) if the ((111ral bank reacts to cumvhl1 ittfiatioir. and output yap, bulls 
pas i cct does not affect local stability ariclrr leaIllittg; 
Consider the case of no irrafspaielicy. 
(ii) A policy u-ale of the form: it _ (J, n 
E 1711 n1 r1', with h 1', ti'. ('I? 
leads to a non-learnable REF; 
(iii) Consider the policy role: is = %, Li'- 7r1- i+y, rIa'_ rJ'+ 
d'Et-t v. c and a5sv. 711(, Without loss of geneirility that pr - /1" 0. Then 
the stability conditions under learning an, the sann' as in PruposI17071 (,? i). 
/hi particular, if rj)., =0 the REF is non-learnablce for a7i. y pamnirtrr value. 
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Consider the case of some degree of transparency; 
(iv) the rules above are stable under learning, provided the Taylor Prin- 
ciple is satisfied. 
Proof. see Appendix C.   
3.6 When Transparency Matters. Comments. 
The analysis in the previous sections shows that two conditions need to be 
verified in order for transparency to affect local stability under learning. 
First, agents need to forecast the current or the future interest rate, in order 
to take consumption or production decisions. Even though knowledge of the 
policy rule helps to predict future output and inflation, this does not alter 
the stability conditions under learning. Second, the central bank also needs 
to use forecast in order to take interest rate decisions. In the case where the 
bank reacts to current output and inflation, knowledge about the policy rule 
doe not change local stability under learning. This is because the learning 
process of the agents does not affect directly the interest rate dynamics. 
Hence, the unrestricted VAR coefficients corresponding to the interest rate 
equation converge for any parameter value. In other words, from the proofs 
in the Appendix, the characteristic equation of the Jacobian can be written 
as 
ý)(, \2 + alA + ao) 
where the eigenvalue corresponding to the interest equation is equal to-1 for 
any parameter value. It is obvious that under these conditions knowing the 
policy rule does not affect local stability after learning, even though it might 
have welfare improving effects in reducing overall volatility. Concluding, 
necessary and sufficient condition for transparency to matter is a) the central 
bank responding to forecasts (possibly different from the private sector's and 
b) the market forecasting the interest rate. 
It is also worth mentioning that the response of the economy to a shock 
would be different, for empirically plausible parameter values, whether the 
market understands the policy rule or not. In the case of transparency the 
economy converges back to the steady state monotonically, even though the 
effects on inflation are likely to be persistent. In the case of no transparency 
the convergence is oscillatory, with possible negative effects on welfare. I 
leave a more complete analysis of these effects to further research. The 
following section attempts a numerical evaluation of the effects of lack of 
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transparency with a model estimated on US data. Simulations show that 
under the Woodford calibration and a standard Taylor rule, the behavior 
of the economy under full transparency can hardly be distinguished by the 
REE. Lack of transparency instead lead to undesired fluctuations. 
3.7 Monetary Policy Transparency and Macroeco- 
nomic Performance 
3.7.1 Monetary Shocks and the Benefits of 7Iansparency: 
Preliminary Simulation Results 
As mentioned above, lack of transparency affects economic stability also 
in the case where the REE is locally stable under learning. If the mone- 
tary authority responds with sufficient aggressiveness to the output gap, it 
can prevent self-fulfilling inflation or deflation, but lack of transparency still 
affects the way the economy responds to shocks. In order to give a quan- 
titative impact of these effects, I consider an artificial economy, calibrated 
using Woodford's estimates. In order to evaluate quantitatively the effects 
of transparency for a particular economies, we would need an estimated of 
the structural parameters and the shock disturbances affecting the econ- 
omy. This analysis is performed in the sections below. This preliminary 
simulations are conducted including only the policy shock. 
I consider a more general Taylor tule with interest smoothing. The rule 
can be written as 
it =i+ Pit-i +(l -P) [0,, E8 (7rt - lr') + /xE 
! (xt -x*)] + ft (3.31) 
In fact, Bullard and Mitra (2002) show that interest smoothing has a sta- 
bilizing effect on the economy. The simulations below show that even in 
this case lack of transparency has a considerable effect on the dynamic of 
output, inflation and interest rate. In the simulations I assume p=0.7. 
The following figures show that also in the case of local stability under 
learning, lack of transparency have important consequences of the dynam- 
ics of inflation. The only sizable shock that I consider is the monetary 
shock et. I also include i. i. d. r^ and ut shocks with negligible standard 
deviation, in order to make the learning process nontrivial. I assume that 
a, = 0.0025, a,. = 0.0001, au = 0.0001. I further assume that the agents use 
the Stochastic Gradient algorithm to update their coefficients. The simula- 
tions start with the economy at its REE. I do not assume structural changes 
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in the parameters. Fluctuations from learning depend on the constant revi- 
sion of the agents' estimates. It is assumed that market participants expect 
changes in policy and other structural parameters so that they update their 
estimates using constant gain algorithms, where Öt = J. 
Learning Dynamics 
Assuming a fixed gain algorithm has the implication that the matrix of coef- 
ficients Sgt described above does not converge to the REE W. This because 
learning becomes a persistent process The agents expect structural changes 
in their model and therefore discount past observations and keep updating 
their estimates as new observations are available. Nevertheless, provided the 
gain St =Ö is 'small', results from Benviste, Metivier and Priouret (1993) 
show19 that the matrix of coefficient converges to a time-invariant Gaussian 
distribution, centered in SZ'. The variance of the distribution tends to zero 
as the gain tends to zero. Hence the the stochastic process generated by 
the model is asymptotically stationary, for large t. This allows us to use the 
estimation method described below. Also, the asymptotic behavior of the 
estimated coefficients is a source of extra volatility and fluctuations in the 
economic variables, with respect to the case of RE. 
Simulation Results 
In the simulations I use a benchmark case where 0=1.5, q=0.5/4 and 
8=0.05. I then consider the effects of, a) increasing the gain to 0.1 and b) 
decreasing the coefficient of the output gap to 0.2/4. 
Simulation results show that, under the benchmark calibration, if the 
central bank is fully transparent and credible the dynamics of inflation under 
learning is virtually identical to the REE. This result resembles the finding 
of Williams (2002). Instead, lack of transparency implies more volatility and 
persistence in the inflation process. The tables below reports more specific 
results on the effects of transparency. 
Table II 
1DSee also Evans and Honkapohja (2001). 
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¢x = 0.5/4; 3=0.05 REE Transparency No Transparency 
a (x) 1.7109 1.7118 2.1272 
o (ir) 0.2451 0.2456 0.3825 
a (i) 1.0707 1.07118 1.1595 
corr (xt, xt-1) 0.3548 0.3574 0.5193 
corr (lrt, lrt-i) 0.3455 0.3516 0.7022 
corn (it, it-1) 0.3553 0.3580 0.4518 
The results are mean values, obtained by simulating the economy for 
2000 times. Each time the length of the simulation is 2000 periods. Notice 
how both standard deviation and autocorrelation of the variables increase, 
with respect of the REE. On the other hand, an higher gain also increases 
both standard deviation and volatility. 
Table III 
0x = 0.5/4; 9=0.1 REE Transparency No Transparency 
a(x) 1.7109 1.7122 2.5005 
Q (7r) 0.2451 0.2463 0.5157 
a 5) 1.0707 1.0714 1.2570 
corr(xt, Xt-1) 0.3548 0.3574 0.5995 
corr (7rt, lrt-1) 0.3455 0.3559 0.8277 
corr (it, it_1) 0.3553 0.3581 0.5307 
Table IV 
0x = 0.2/4; ö=0.05 REE Transparency No Transparency 
a (x) 2.3728 2.3727 3.0792 
o (ý) 0.3741 0.3741 0.6039 
Q (i) 1.1000 1.0999 1.2869 
co r (xt, xt-1) 0.4165 0.4163 0.6010 
co r (7rt, 7rt-i) 0.4119 0.4124 0.7479 
corr (it, it-I) 0.4167 0.4165 0.5707 
This might suggest an alternative explanation for the higher volatility 
and persistence of inflation, at business cycle frequencies, during the 70's. 
Clarida, et al. (1999) and Boivin and Giannoni (2002) among the others 
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claim that high fluctuations in the pre-Volker were due to a too passive Tay- 
lor rule. This implies an indeterminate REE equilibrium and thus undesired 
fluctuations. This view could be questioned on two grounds. 
First, the analysis above seems to suggest that even allowing for perfect 
knowledge of the policy rule, the indeterminate REE associated to a passive 
policy rule is not going to be learnable. This rises the question of the 
plausibility of this equilibrium (unless one would regard the rising inflation 
in the 70s as a the non-stationary outcome of a non learnable REE). 
Second, Orphanides (2003), using real time data, shows that the Taylor 
rule has been active in the post war period. If this is a plausible description 
of US monetary policy, then no indeterminate equilibrium would exist. 
Assume that in the pre-Volker era the market did not properly under- 
stand monetary policy decisions, while from the 80' the public have spent 
more resources to analyze Fed behavior and Fed have become increasingly 
transparent about its decisions (especially since the 90s'). Then the results 
shown above seem to suggest an alternative explanation for undesired fluc- 
tuations. A proper evaluation of this hypothesis should be left to further 
research20. 
3.8 Conclusions 
The paper shows that transparency matters for monetary policy design. I 
consider the case where a class of policy rules is evaluated for robustness 
to forecasting mistakes of the market participants. I show that in a model 
where monetary policy has immediate effects on aggregate activity and in- 
flation, knowledge about the policy rule does not enhance the stability of 
the economic system. 
In the more empirically plausible case where expenditure and pricing 
decisions are predetermined, and therefore monetary policy affects the econ- 
omy with delays, a transparent implementation of policy rule is crucial for 
the stability of the economic system. Lack of transparency might gener- 
ate instability to forecasting mistakes and other equilibria generated by the 
learning behavior. A more transparent implementation of the rule instead 
guarantees stability of the unique fEE, provided the central bank reacts to 
some degree to the output gap. 
Finally, the paper proposes a method to estimate the learning model 
with simulated quasi-maximum likelihood methods. 
"For example, the model should be evaluated including realistic assumptions on the 
shock processes. 
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Future research should address the case of inertial policy rule and the role 
of transparency in this case. Also, in this paper I model delays in the effects 
of monetary policy with lagged expectations. The role of transparency on 
learnability should be investigated in the case where delays are captured by 
lagged variables. 
3.9 Appendix A. The Model Solution. 
The budget constraint (3.4) can be rewritten as 
At + Ct =1 
1t -1 At-1 - 
it-1 ýt - t-1 mit-, +tf 
(h-t, M) 
- Tt (3.32) Pt Pt 
where At =(Bt + Mt)/Pt denotes real wealth and the term `` 1 is the ilt 
opportunity cost of holding money, expressed in real terms. Substituting 
the budget constraint (3.32) in (3.3) the maximization problem becomes 
max 
Ai, mi, h, I, P 
00 U 
(i+ne_'At_1 + mt_l +Y D( )- Al - Tt, 
E (_Pj . 
me) 
_l Eat 
l2 
2 
+At f (ht*, mt) - YtD(t ) 
where At is the Lagrangian multiplier. Differentiating with respect to , imposing a symmetric equilibrium and substituting for the equilibrium con- 
dition YY = Ct + Gt =f (ht, rrct), the expression is simplified to 
E t_i 
U' (Yt - Gt, T4) (Y -Gt) (1 + Bt) - atot+ 0 (3.33) 
--ft Pt - n') nt + ßi't (nt+i - n') nt+i 
where Ot = D't/Dt < -1 for every t. The f. o. c. for the labor supply is 
Ee-i ., a -A 
Vß(14) 
= 0. (3.34) (hi, 
mi) 
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Substituting for At in (3.33) gives 
(nt - n*)11t = ßE_1(nt+i - n*) nt+i + (3.35) 
Bt 
-Et-1 (ý'i, mt) (Y - Gt) - (st - fiti)J (3.36) 7t 
[U. 
= 8E _1(nt+i - n*) nt+i + 
-Et-1 
{tJc (Y Gt, 'ºTZt) (Y - G) (last -1)J (3.37) 
where 
V'(ht) (3.38) st = T(ht, mt) UU (Yt - Gt, mt) 
is the average real marginal cost and tit = Bt/ (1 + Bt) is the desired mark 
up. Last, the f. o. c. with respect to assets and money balances are 
EE_1 [Ue (Ct, mt)] = ßEi 1 [tic (Ct+i, mt+l) (1 + it)] (3.39) nt+1 J 
which gives the consumption Euler equation, and 
EE-1 [Um (Ct, mt)] = ßEt_1 
f Uc (Ct+i, 
+1) 
(it - ir)) (3.40) 
= Et -j 
[Uc(Ctrnt)(it_ir)] 
+ (1 
which gives (implicitly) a money demand function for the consumer. There 
is also an implicit demand function for the producer, which can be shown 
to be 
f( htt) 
fý (ht, mt), (3.41) 
itn Et-i 
{Um(Ctmt) 
\Zl + it /J 
Et-1 
{_V'(h) 
3.9.1 The Linearized Model 
Money in the Utility Function 
As mentioned in the introduction, I consider separately the case of money 
in the utility function and money in the production function. In both cases 
the pricing equation (3.35) can be linearized to get 
7rt = Et-ißirt+i +CEt-i (st +At) (3.42) 
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where 
Ux 
7 
is a measure of the degree of price stickiness. Notice that the linearization 
is a good approximation of the non-linear model only for small values of 
inflation. 
In the case of money in the utility function, the real marginal cost is 
__ 
V'(, f-1(Y)) (3.43) st 
. 
f' (. f (Y t)) U. (Yt - G' t, int) 
Linearizing (3.43) 1 obtain 
st = (Q-1 + w) kt - v-lgt - xtnt (3.44) 
where 
-- 
Uo(? -G,, ) >0 U,, 
- 
(Y-0, rn) 
is the intertenporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. 
fn) fn 
fn) 
measures the marginal utility of extra consumption, as real balances change 
and 
V" (f')? 
ww = fý (Y) V, (Y) >0 
defines the elasticity of the marginal disutility of work with respect to out- 
put. 
w >0 
defines the elasticity of the marginal product of labor with respect to output. 
Finally, w=w,,, + wp. Linearization of the Euler equation (3.39) gives 
4= 
-oEt-i (it - lrt+i) + EtL1 +1 - XaEi-, 
(mi+ý 
- nd) . 
(3.45) 
Linearizing the money demand gives 
mi = 7ly4t - 77iE _1 (ft - it) (3.46) 
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where I use the fact that each agent knows his consumption at time t, when 
deciding the amount of money. where ray > 0, res >0 denote the elasticity of 
money demand with respect to income and the nominal interest rate. The 
coefficients can be shown to be 
77y _ 
rXC + AQ'1 
X+ Emm 
J 
i-A 7_ 0X+Emm 
and 
Umc(Y-G, m) 
Xc - Uc (Y - G', 7n) 
Um,,, (Y-G, m) 2 
Ems - U, (Y - G, rrm) 
Substituting (3.46) in (3.45), 1 get 
c-t = -&EE-i [77i (it - zi `) - lrt+i - 772 (zt+l - zt+i)l + Erie! +1 
where q1 = (1 + X770 > 11 772 = 771 -1>0, and a=°>a. Assum- 1Xr17y 
ing that the agents understand that their future consumption depend on 
aggregate output21, i. e. that C1 = Y+1 - Gt+l, then their consumption 
decisions depend on their expectations about future output, inflation, inter- 
est rate and government expenditures. Imposing equilibrium in the goods 
market and aggregating over the agents I obtain the IS equation with real 
money balances effects 
xt = -QEt-i [hut - 7121' - 7rt+i - 772 (zt - it `) - *i ]+ Et-ixt+i (3.47) 
where xt =Y- kt, is the output gap, expressed as output deviations 
from the efficient level 1' . Following Woodford (2003), the efficient 
level of 
output can be defined by 
s (ye, ' , C) = T'. 
(3.48) 
21 This is not a strong asumption. As mentioned in Evans, Honkapohja and Mitra (2002), 
running a regression of consumption on the output gap and government expenditures 
would reveal what I am assuming. 
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Notice that markup shocks do not affect the efficient level of output. Using 
the money demand function and linearizing (3.48) 1 obtain 
ý'te =+ 
xvb) 9t 
mc 
where e,,,, = (a-' +w- Xr7y) denotes the elasticity of the real marginal cost 
and 
e 
_n Yt -1't + -At enw 
where Yt" is the equilibrium level of output if prices are fully flexible, given 
a monetary policy that maintains a constant interest rate spread between 
monetary and nonmonetary assets. The (exogenous) process r't is defined 
as 
ri = a-1 - 71yx) 
(Et-lYt`+i 
-k t' -1 (Et-t9t+l - 9t) 
In order to simplify the analysis and consistently with the previous literature 
I assume that ft is observable and evolves as an AR(1) process. All variables 
are in log-levels. This is consistent with the assumption that the agents do 
not know the long run equilibrium of the variables, and in particular the 
inflation target. Notice that current expenditures depend on expectations 
about the current and the future interest rate. 
Finally, combining (3.44) with the money demand curve, and using the 
definition of efficient output I obtain the following Phillips curve 
7rt = Et-ißirt+i + ýcEt-i Pt + 173 (it -t `)A + Ut 
where 
K= SEmc 
i3 =iX 
and ut = 
(Eme) Et_lµt. Notice that the shock is pre-determined at time t. 
Money in the Production Function 
In this case he real marginal cost is 
V'(ht) (3.49) st f'(ht, mt)Uc(Yt-Gt) 
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Defining 
ht =H(Yt, mt) 
with Hy >0 and H,,,. < 0, it is possible to rewrite (3.49) as a function of 
output and money balances only. Hence, 
V'(H(Yt, ")) 
St = 1' (H (Y t, int)) U,, (Yt - Gt) 
Log-linearization leads to the following expression 
st = (01-1 + w) kt + Q-19t - Xfºl't 
where 
w=Ww+ Whh 
%= Xvv + Xhh + Xhm 
Ww _ 
yii (H (7, r", )) Hy (Y+ m) y> 0 
V' (H(?, in-» 
whh =- . 
fhh (Y, rn) Hy (Y, m, ) Y>0 
fh (Y+ m) 
V"(H(? 
'm))Hm(?, m)m>0 Xvv 
V, (H (Y, 7"ý) 
Xhh 
Ah )Hm(?, n)i'>0 
t'h (Y, m) 
Xhm = 
fhm (?, m) m>0. 
fh (Y, m) 
The Euler equation for consumption and thus the IS equation do not 
depend on real money balances. The IS is equivalent to (3.47) with r=1 
and 772 = 0. 
The money demand function can be linearized to yield 
t= I7yct - ý; Et_1(i - ft) (3.50) 
where 
_ 
Ww+Whm+Whh+Q-1 
71y - 
\Xvv'+'Xhm+Xmm'+'Xhh+Xhm/ 
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where 
wmh _ . 
fmh (?, m) Hc (P, m) ?>0 
fm (?, m') 
Xrf"`h(P, 
m)Hm (?, tz)fn 
>0 
f, (1', m) 
fmm (Y, m) m 
>ý Xmm=- 
m-(?, m) 
and 
A 
i ýi -\ Xvv + Xhm + Xmm + Xhh + Xhm 
Inserting the demand for money (3.50) in the real marginal cost equation, I 
obtain 
9t = (or-' +w- Xýy) Y+5 ýjEt-1 (it - it) + (01-1 + XMy) yt. 
Proceeding as for the case of money in the utility function, it is possible to 
express the real marginal cost in terms of deviations of current output from 
its efficient level 
st = Emckt + X'/iEt-1 (it - it) 
where, again, 2, = (Q-1 +'- Xýy). The log-linear Phillips curve is again 
7rt = Ei-1Qirt+i +ýEt-ist 
Substituting the real marginal cost in the Phillips curve we get 
lrt = Et-ißirt+i + ýcEt-i [it +773 (it - zt")A +ü 
where 
k= SEme 
NX 
r%3 = E", 
and it is defined as above. 
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3.10 Appendix B. Stability With t Expectations. 
The proofs make use of the mathematical results described by Theorems 4 
and 5, in CH. 1. 
Proof. Proposition (33) 
(i) Local stability is determined by the stability of the following differ- 
ential equation in notional time 
dfl 
_T (S2) - S2 Tr 
where 
T (O) = 
(Al + Ä2S20, Ä2111H + Ä3) . 
Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), E-Stability is obtained, provided 
the following matrices have eigenvalues with real parts less than one. 
A2 
- 13 (3.51) 
and 
H ®Ä2 -13- (3.52) 
It is enough to verify the condition for (3.51), given that pr, pu < 1. 
The characteristic equation of (3.51) can be factorized in the form 
P(a) _- (1 + a) (a2 + alA + ao) 
where 
vk[07r-11 +&Ox(1-Q)[1+(1-10)7721+ 
al 
+&KOr (1- irl) -Qn773_x+(1-ß) = (771- &r-O. +äOxrli+1 
and ÖIC (q5 1) -i- Q0a (1 - Q) +6k- U1C 13ýs 
ao =/ (771- &r-O,, +&0x711+ 
The conditions to be satisfied to obtain stability are 
>0. ao>0, al 
Given that 771 -'13 >0 and a>1, we have that al > ao. Hence, stability 
obtains if ao > 0. This gives condition (3.12). 
Also, when the change of stability occurs, ao is equal to zero. That 
means that the eigenvalues are real. Hence, no local Hopf bifurcation occurs 
and the inflation target is the only equilibrium.   
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Proof. Proposition (34) 
I study the convergence properties of the algorithm by using stochastic 
approximation theory, using results by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and 
Marcet and Sargent (1989). In order to apply those results, I need to put 
the system (3.20) in the following form: 
G= G-1 + aa-INee-1, St) (3.53) 
St = G(Et-, )St-1 + Cvt 
which is achieved by setting: 
Ct =[ Bt vec (Rt) 
Bt=[ Yt Xt] 
Gr =r 
03x3 T(et-1) 1 
IL 02x3 HJ 
where 0 is the d-dimensional vector of the estimates, S represents the state 
vector, v is the disturbance term and C its coefficients. The latter two are 
trivially identifiable. The local dynamics of this system (local convergence), 
i. e. the stability of the RE equilibrium depend on the associated ODE: 
dB/dr = h(B) (3.54) 
where h(B) = limt,,,. EI) (0, St (0)). An exhaustive survey of this approach 
with analytical proofs can be found in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Given 
that the system can be put in the in form (3.53), it is easy to verify that it 
satisfies the properties, A. 1, A. 2, B. 1, B. 2 in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). 
First, I can rewrite the matrices of regressors as: 
ZZ(9 . 1) = K' 
(Ba-i) Qt (3.55) 
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where 
100 
10 10 
til (Bt-i) 
KI (et-1) = 03,3 
03,3 
Substituting (3.55) in (3.20) 1 get 
03,3 03,3 
100 
Tx' (Bt-1) 03,3 
001 
100 
03,3 
7'"' (et-1) 
Bt = 9t-i + at-RT 
11Qt (r (Bt-i) Qt - (ei-1K' (et-i) Qt)') 
+i. i. d. errors 
it= t-i + at 
(Qt (K' (6a-i) Qt)' - 74-1) 
where 
r (Bt-1) = 
(7'x' 
(et-1) i' (Bt-1) P, (Ot-1) 
) 
Rearranging, the system becomes 
Bt = e_ i+57 
l1QtQt ("' (Bt-i) -K (Bt-i) Ot-1) 
+i. i. d. errors 
Rt = Tt-1 + St (QtQ'K (Bt-i) - Rt-i) 
By taking the asymptotic mean, the convergence properties can be studied 
by checking the stability of the following ODE 
dR 
_MQK(9)-R (3.56) 
de 
=)7-1 MQ (T (0) -K (0) 0) (3.57) TT- 
where MQ = Eli,. t,. (QtQ'D. Given that, from the first equation 
R-+MQK(0) 
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- the stability analysis reduces to: 
ae 
aT =K (0)-1 Mr1MQ (T (e) -x (e) B) 
=x (9)-1 T (6) - 9. 
The resulting system is a non-linear function of r and B and a complicated 
expression of the single parameters. Using Matlab Symbolic Toolbox it is 
possible to show that the linearized system is composed of three independent 
subsystems 
C boi 1= Go 
(bo1 
(3.58) 
boa J bot 
5o z-0,7r* - Ox* Wo 
0. 
x 
(3.59) 
YA 
0A 
- 
7A 
and 
ill Iii 
721 
_ Gl 
721 (3.60) 
bii bii 
bit biz 
First, (3.59) shows that the estimates of the Taylor rule converge for any 
parameter value. This is expected, because as I mentioned in the main 
text, the agents' equation is correctly specified at any point in time. Hence, 
provided that output and inflation stay bounded, the estimates will converge. 
Also, it is possible to show that the characteristic equation of (3.58) is the 
same as for A2 - 13 (even if Go 0 A2 - r., so that the matrices are similar). 
(ii) The system (3.60) is more complicated and it is not possible find 
an analytical solution. Imposing U, i =0 it is possible to show that the 
eigenvalues of (3.52) and G1 are the same so that the matrices are similar. 
For the general case, I had to resort to simulation, as mentioned in the 
Proposition. Repeated simulations suggest that Gl and (3.52) are similar 
for every parameter value. 
(iii) The result trivially depends on the fact that the stability of (3.58) 
and (3.60) do not depend on the estimates of the policy parameters.   
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3.11 Appendix C. Stability With t-1 Expectations. 
Proof. Proposition (35) 
The model can be written in matrix form as 
V= Ao + Ai SEPiVV + A°BEE BVt + A2EPiV +1 + A3Xt + et. (3.61) 
Consider the E-Stability conditions. Inserting the PLMs I get 
VT (1 S, S B1 oPS) S21 B) 
I 
Xt a1+ 
et (3.62) 
the mapping between the PLM and ALM is described by the following ODE 
dcz S= 
Ao + (Aps - I3) fS+ A°BS2o B+ AZSto S (3.63) dr 
dSl B= 
Ao + (A? B -13) Slo a+ APSSlo S+ A2SZo 
S (3.64) 
dT 
dfl 
= APSSZPS + Ai BSI°B + A2S2l s+ A3H - Sti 
s (3.65) 
d-r 
d12 s= AfSczis + AlBI B+ A2fIjPS + A3H - S22 
S (3.66) 
d7 
Stability under learning is determined by the following independent subsys- 
tems 
[ 
Ica) = Fi (3.67) 
[ 
Ica] 
[veci? ] 
=F2 
[ 
vet] 
(3.68) 
where 
APS-I3+A2 A, B F1 =( APS + A2 A? B - I3 
) 
(3.69) 
_ 
12 ®API +H®A2-I6 I2®A°B F2- 
( 
I2®AiS+H®A2 I20A1B-16 
). 
(3.70) 
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In order to extract the stability conditions I follow Honkapohja and 
Mitra (2002). Stability under learning is obtained if the eigenvalues of F1 
and F2 have negative real parts. The characteristic equations of associated 
to the two matrices can be simplified to 
IF1 -V6I =I 
Aps-13(1+A)+A2 A? B 
_I 
(3.71) 
Al + A2 Al 13 (1 + \) 
= (-(l+ \))2IAfS+AiB+A2-I3(1+A) I 
.- and 
I F2-aI121 =I I2( Alps +H®AZ I2®AcB-I6(1+a) 
I (3.72) 
_ (-(1+a))6II20Alps +H®A2+I2®A°B-(1+A)I61 . 
So, determining stability boils down to determinate whether the eigenvalues 
of the following matrices have negative real part 
to v -ä 
Al = APs + A°B + A2 - 13 = ru Q -1 k773 (3.73) 
Oy Ox -1 
and 
A2 = APS +, Ai B+p. A2" (3.74) 
for i=r, u. Let us consider first (3.73). According to Routh's Theorem, the 
number of roots of (3.73) with positive real parts is equal to the number of 
variations of sign in the following scheme 
-1 Trace (Äl) _ B1 + 
Det(Äl) Det(Al) (3.75) 
1Yace (Al) 
where 
Trace (A1) =ß -2<0 (3.76) 
Det(Ai) _- [rc (07r - 1) + (1- ß) c5x] 
+7)3KOx <0 (3.77) 
provided (3.22) holds (3.78) 
Bi = -ko + Qoa 
+ (1 - ß) - 1I3r'Oir (3.79) 
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where B is the sum of all second order principle minors of Al. A pattern of 
-- -- corresponds to all eigenvalues having negative real part. In order 
to obtain that we need 
-B1 " Trace (Al) + Det(Al) >0 (3.80) 
Algebraic manipulations show that (3.80) is positive if ¢. > ý., in the 
Proposition is verified. Consider the matrix A2. It is easy to show that 
Trace (A2) =pi (1 +, B) -3<0 (3.81) 
Det(Ä2)= -& [i (Q57r - Pi) + Oa (1 - QPi) (771 - Pi772)] + 
-k (1-p)(6771-113)-(1-Pj) (2 -ßP0 <0 
provided (3.22) holds 
B2 = -kPip+(771-A772)QOy+2-Q(1+Pi)+ (3.82) 
(1- Pi) (1- QPf) - 713kq5n" 
Assume (3.22) holds. SinceB2 > BI, Det(A2)<Det(Ai) and Trace (A2)<Trace 
(Al), -B2"Trace (A2)+Det(A2)>O, if (3.80) is satisfied. So that provided 
that cx >q, the REE is stable under learning. 
(ii) Notice that if (3.80) is not verified the sign pattern becomes -- 
+-, which indicates two eigenvalues with positive real parts. Since, the 
determinant of Al does not vanish at fix, we know that the eigenvalues are 
complex. 
(ii) Determinacy obtains if (13 - AP s+ Ai B) -1 AZ 
Shas eigenvalues in- 
side the unit circle. The characteristic equation can be factorized to give 
P(a)_-. 1(A2+alA+ao) 
where 
al 
(77247r + K7730x -f- rl -f- 7]20y + 130x77i) ä- N7730ir ++ to 
(r, 7710a + Ox7h) 6+1- r77307r 
and 
_ 
Q(1 + ßr126) 
Q0 (117710n+Ox7h)6+1-N7730? r 
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The conditions for determinacy are 
laol<1, lall<l+ao 
The first condition is verified, given that i 7j& > 77g. Notice that the denomi- 
nator is positive, provided 'h > 773 and a>1. Also, imposing the condition 
mentioned in the main text we have that al < 0, so that the condition for 
determinacy becomes 
-al < 1+ao 
which gives (3.12). 
Finally, local uniqueness of the equilibrium comes from the fact that 
indeterminacy occurs as -al =1+ ao. Hence the eigenvalues are real at 
the bifurcation point so that there is no Hopf bifurcation. Moreover, the 
maximum eigenvalue is positive, so that we can exclude a flip bifurcation. 
This implies that no other equilibria exist close to the inflation target.   
Proof. Proposition (36) 
(i) Consider first the convergence properties of the policy rule estimates. 
Assume that the central bank and the private sector have the same expec- 
tations. This is without loss of generality, from the results above. Then 
substituting the expectations in the Taylor rule we get 
'Pt = 'Pc-i + StR; t_1Xc_1 
[¢' (SZt_1 Wt_1) + et - Ot_1 
(S2t-1Wt-il 
J 
P,, /,, t = R, I, t-1 + it 
[xt_1 (fit-iwt-i)' 
- P,, G, t-i, 
where 0 denotes the true policy coefficients. This can be rearranged to yield 
t= ýbe-i + aaR 
t_1We-iWi-iOe-1 (0 - Pt-i + Et) 
The corresponding ODE is 
ý=R; 'MSY (¢ -'b) 
AO = 
(Mfl I- RO ) 
where M= Et.,,. WtWt. Hence, we have that RO - MO'. Substituting in 
the above we obtain q -º i/i. Consider the other coefficients. The updating 
mechanism is 
fii = f4-1 + st ilt-i 
[Vt 
-Sys-i We-iý (3.83) 
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Re = Re-i + 5t (Wt-1Wt_i - Ra-i) . It is possible to express (3.83) as 
ci = ýi-i + atRt li Wt-i 
[i" Cat-ý 
t-i) Wt-l - Ot-iWt-i + Ct, 
' (3.84) 
where 
(B1Ot-1Ot-1 
+ BA-1 + B30t-1SZt-1H + B4! 5t-1H + B5) 
Vt = Bo + B1Vit-1 EE BVt + B2EPiVt + (3.85) 
+B37/i't-1 E 1V 1+ B4E 't 1+ B5Xt-1 + Ct (3.86) 
it =z+O,, Et ä(irt - -7r`) + cbxEt' ä (xt - z*) + et 
It is then possible to rearrange (3.84) into 
ei + ÖtR li Wt-i We i 
[T SZi-i -F Si] . 
The associated ODE can be calculated as 
dr = IT (ö, 0) - o'] 
where I use the fact that, a) R -º M; b) 0 -º 0. It is straightforward 
to show that stability under learning depends on the eigenvalues of the 
following matrix 
I31 -I- 
ä2 
- I2 -- 
c& & (1- 0) 
IC 
(3.87) 
(1+773ýy) Q+ Ki30a-1 
and 
where 
B1 + p; B2 - 12 (3.88) 
fl1 
= B1' + B2; B2 = B30'+ B4 
In order to have negative eigenvalues, both the trace and the determinant 
should be negative. Consider the case U,,,,,, = 0. It is straightforward to 
show that the eigenvalues of the matrix (3.87) are negative provided the 
Taylor Principle holds. Also it is possible to show that if the matrix (3.88) 
satisfies this property, then also matrix (3.87) will satisfy it. Furthermore, 
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the determinant of Bl-I-B2-(1 +A) 12 vanishes if the Taylor condition holds 
with equality. Hence the eigenvalues are real and no Hopf bifurcation occur. 
(ii) In the case of perfect transparency and SG learning it is easy to 
verify that the associated ODE becomes 
dSt' 
=M 
[O'B + HSZ'B2 - SZ] dT 
by vectorizing and transposing we obtain 
vec 
(S2) 
= ((M 013)) 
[(I ®Bl) + (H ® B2) - I9] vec (f2). 
Using the fact that M is diagonal I can re-express the matrix as 
(B1+B2-i3) 
Ml 
(Bl + Pr' 2- I3). 
m2 
(B1 + puE2 - I3) 
where I need to adjust notation for the constant and ml, m2 are the elements 
of M on the diagonal. Given the fact that by definition ml, m2 are positive, 
the stability condition is identical to the case with RLS. Consider the case of 
imperfect transparency. With SG, it is possible to show that the linearized 
ODE becomes 
Mfl' (0 - TO, 0M [ 
vec(SZ') j-[ Bi 0 MCI' + B3 0 MHS ' CC 
I 
vec 
(1) 
CC=B1i, '®M+B2 ®M+B3zb'®MH+B4®MH-10 M 
evaluating the equation at the REE coefficients we get 
f 
ve 
( 
,) 
J-BB[ 
ve (W) 
] 
MO*' 0 BB = Bl®MSZ*'+B3®MHSZ*' Bl0 M+B2®HM-I0 M 
Stability conditions depend on the eigenvalues of the matrices -MSZ*' and 
Bl 0M+ B2 ® HM -I®M. Hence, from the results in 
(ii), the Taylor 
principle it is not sufficient for stability of the REE. 
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(iii) Consider the case where UU+ > 0. In this case the trace is nega- 
tive if OX6 +1-ß- K7730ir > 0. This implies that, also in the case of full 
transparency, a policy rule that does not react to the output gap is destabi- 
lizing. Nevertheless transparency increases the set of rules that are robust 
to expectational mistakes. In order to show this, notice that (3.80) implies 
Ox&+1 -ß- , 30, > Ü/C 
--IC(Oa - 1) 2! Ox 1 -Q) -IC7I3Oýx >0 
which is a more stringent condition for stability than in the case of full trans- 
parency. Combining the stability conditions for the case of transparency, I 
obtain the condition (3.30)   
Proof. Proposition (37) 
(i) The characteristic equation in the case of no transparency can be 
written as 
P (A) _ (1 + A) (A2 + al + ao) 
where 
al = Oxa -F (1 - Q) - Ki30a 
ao = r'(Oa - 1) + Ox (1 - ß) - r'7%30x" 
It can be easily verified that the same condition can be found imposing full 
transparency, following the same steps as in the proof above. 
(ii) This is equivalent to setting 0x =0 in (3.5). 
(iii) I assume p,, = p,, = 0, in order to simplify the proof. Consistently 
with the findings in the previous proofs, I expect the result would not change 
for positive autoregressive components. Under the current assumptions, the 
stability under learning depends on the eigenvalues of (3.73). 
(iv) Under the current assumptions, the stability under learning depends 
on the eigenvalues of (3.87).   
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